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 With women’s increased education and labor market participation in the last few 
decades the labor market has changed considerably. At the same time the interaction 
between household activities and work have been constantly evolving, affecting 
household dynamics and family outcomes, such as fertility, marriage and divorce. 
 The first chapter explores the effect of unrestricted access to the birth control pill 
on young people’s career plans, using annual surveys of college freshmen from 1968 
to 1980. In particular it addresses the question of who was affected by the 
introduction of the birth control pill by looking at career plans of both men and 
women, and by separating the effect by level of academic ability and race. The results 
show that unrestricted access to the pill caused high ability women to move towards 
occupations with higher wages, higher occupational prestige scores and higher male 
ratios. The estimated effects for women with low grades and from low selectivity 
colleges are in the opposite direction. Men were also affected by unrestricted access 
to the pill, as their aspirations shifted towards traditionally male dominated 
occupations, across all ability groups. The biggest effect of unrestricted access to the 
  
pill is found to be on non-white students, both among men and women. The paper 
uses Census Data to compare the changes in career plans to actual changes in labor 
market outcomes. When looking at the actual career outcomes, early access to the pill 
affects both men and women - shifting their careers towards traditionally male 
dominated occupations associated with higher wages. Early access to the pill is also 
associated with significantly higher actual income for men.   
 In the second chapter I look at the relationship between increased access to 
reliable fertility controls and men’s disappearance from teaching. As the pill has been 
found to have a substantial effect on women’s family responsibilities, career 
investments and labor market outcomes, men’s bargaining position in the marriage 
market is likely to have changed considerably. Teaching stands out among the career 
choices of male college freshmen in terms of average income and prestige. The effect 
of the shift in bargaining power on men’s career choices is hence likely to be 
prominent in the teaching sector. Between 1968 and 1980, the ratio of male college 
freshmen planning to become a teacher fell from 12.4% to 2.4% and the share of 
males among those who aspired to teach dropped from 30.6% to 19.7%. Using 
nationally representative data on the career plans of college freshmen I find that 
unrestricted access to the birth control pill bears a negative relation to the likelihood 
that men plan to teach, while changes in the strength of teacher unions and relative 
wages of teachers have limited effect on their career plans. Men’s aspirations shift 
away from teaching towards occupations that are associated with higher average 
income like accounting and computer programming. The results are supported by 
equivalent findings looking at actual career outcomes in the Census Data.  
  
 The third chapter focuses on the role of discrimination and the possibility that 
education as a tool to reveal ability is more important among women than men. As 
social networks tend to run along gender lines and managers in the labor market are 
predominantly male, it may be more difficult for women to signal their ability without 
college credentials. Moreover, women may use education to signal their labor market 
attachment. A game theoretical model of racial discrimination and educational 
sorting, introduced by Lang and Manove (2011) is applied to examine the gender gap 
in schooling attainment. As the gender gap differs between demography groups, 
being more prominent for blacks and Hispanics, the model is estimated separately for 
each race or ethnicity group. Using data from the NLSY79, the results in the paper 
are consistent with a model where education is more valuable to women, due to 
signaling. As predicted by the model, education as a function of ability (measured 
with AFQT scores) is more concave for women than for men. For over 88 % of the 
whites in the sample women choose higher level of education given their ability, than 
do men. On the other hand, the model fits the data better for whites than for blacks 
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“Modern woman is at last free as a man is free, to dispose of her own body, to earn her 
living, to pursue the improvement of her mind, to try a successful career.” 
Claire Boothe Luce, 1969 cited in Seaman (1995), pp 56. 
 
The most apparent effect of an introduction of the birth control pill is the increased ability of 
women to control their fertility outcomes, and thereby making it easier for them to pursue 
more education and better careers than before. The birth control pill has been branded the 
liberator in the press, and the empirical literature has emphasized how it has empowered 
women by enabling them to participate increasingly in the labor market.12 However, the 
theoretical literature suggests that not all women benefited from the introduction of the birth 
control pill, and that it is conceivable that men were the unambiguous winners from its 
innovation.3 In this paper I focus on who was affected by the introduction of the pill, by 
looking at outcomes for both men and women and by separating the effect by academic 
ability and race. 
                                                
1 The birth control pill was referred to as the liberator in The Economist (“Oral Contraceptives: The Liberator”, 
1999) 
2 See e.g. Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006) for the effect of the birth control pill on women’s labor 
market outcomes. 
3 See e.g. Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) 
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One of the most emphasized explanations for the gender gap and gender differences in 
human capital investments is that women’s careers are interrupted by motherhood (see, for 
example, Cramer (1980), Browning (1992), Joshi et al. (1990), Waldfogel (1998), 
Dankmeyer (1996) and Budig and England (2001)). Thus, the introduction of the birth 
control pill, which provided women with effective means to control and time their fertility for 
the first time in history, is likely to have had a great influence on women’s educational and 
labor market decisions. The seminal work of Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006) looks 
at the effect of access to the birth control pill on women’s outcomes. Bailey (2006) finds that 
early access to the pill delayed fertility, increased the number of women in the paid labor 
force, and raised the number of annual hours women worked. Goldin and Katz (2002) present 
evidence that early access to the pill increased the age at first marriage and the share of 
women working in law and medicine. 
While most studies on the effect of the birth control pill have focused on the increased 
power of women who gained more control over their fertility, the theoretical literature 
suggests a more complex story. Akerlof et al. (1996) note how the availability of 
contraceptives may have changed social norms regarding marriage and pregnancy. Until the 
early 1970s, it was customary for a couple to marry in the event of a pregnancy. When the 
availability of oral contraceptives and abortion legalization made having a child a physical 
choice of the mother, marriage and support became a social choice of the man. As sexual 
activity without any promise of commitment, became increasingly expected in premarital 
relationships, women who either wanted children or did not want to use the pill (for example 
for moral or religious reasons), may have found themselves in a worse position than before 
the pill became available. Hence, while unrestricted access to the birth control pill may have 
given men more liberty to pursue their careers and human capital investments, it may have 
increased the likelihood for women to deal with the consequences of premarital sex on their 
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own. Furthermore the framework presented in Goldin and Katz (2002) indicates that men are 
the unambiguous winners from the introduction of the pill through better marriage outcomes. 
In their model women gain on average, but those with the lowest career ability become worse 
off as they are matched with partners of poorer quality than before. 
Using college freshmen surveys from the late 1960s and 1970s the paper examines how 
unrestricted access to the pill affected young people’s career aspirations; specifically, whether 
it induced a shift between traditional female occupations associated with relatively low 
income and low prestige scores, and occupations which require more training and labor 
market attachment. The paper looks at the career plans of both men and women. To address 
the possibility that the gains from the pill were unevenly distributed among different groups 
of people, high school grades and college selectivity are used as proxies to separate the effect 
by career ability. Moreover, the pill effect is separated by individual’s race.  
The analysis differs from previous work, by comparing contemporaneous outcomes for 
people who currently had or did not have unrestricted access, as opposed to comparing later 
life outcomes of those who did or did not obtain unrestricted access before a certain age.  As 
Goldin (2006) points out, observed changes in labor market behavior are preceded by 
changes in expectations. She notes that the female cohorts born in the late 1940s began to 
anticipate longer and more continuous labor market activity. Highlighting the increased 
college attendance and graduation rates among women from these birth cohorts as well as the 
closing gender gap in college majors, she notes that women seemed to plan increasingly for a 
“career” rather than a “job.” In order to investigate whether the changed expectations and 
career plans translated into changes in actual labor market outcomes, I extend the analysis by 
looking at the effect of early access to the pill on occupational outcomes in the Census Data.  
The results are in line with the theoretical arguments as men’s overall career aspirations 
shift towards traditionally male dominated occupations. The biggest effect of the pill is on 
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non-white male students who shift their career plans towards occupations associated with 
higher average income and higher shares of males. The results for men are supported when 
looking at actual career outcomes in the Census Data: men with unrestricted access to the pill 
are more likely to end up in occupations associated with higher income and higher male 
ratios, and early access has moreover a positive and significant effect on their actual income.  
While there is no significant effect on the overall career plans among women there are 
underlying strong, significant and offsetting effects for different ability groups. Women 
attending selective institutions shift their career aspirations towards careers with higher 
incomes, higher prestige scores and higher male ratios. On the other hand, the estimated 
effect for women with low grades and women from colleges with low selectivity points in the 
opposite direction. When the effect of unrestricted access to the pill is separated by race I find 
the positive effect on women’s careers to be restricted to women in minority groups. Looking 
at the actual career outcomes in the Census Data, both men and women end up in careers that 
are associated with higher income and higher share of males. For men the access to the pill is 
also associated with significantly higher actual income, across all ethnicity groups.  
Section 1.2 describes the background on oral contraceptives in the U.S. In Section 1.3 the 
data is described in detail, Section 1.4 presents the framework, Section 1.5 describes the 
analysis and empirical results, and Section 1.6 concludes.  
1.2 Background on Oral Contraceptives in the U.S. 
After its introduction in 1960, the contraceptive pill diffused rapidly, and within six years 
it had become one of the leading pharmaceutical products sold around the world (Marks, 
2001). However, there were considerable restrictions on access to the pill in many states. 
Connecticut and Massachusetts prohibited the sale, distribution or advertisement of any 
device to prevent conception, approximately one third of the states permitted only physicians 
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and licensed pharmacists to dispense contraceptives and more than half of the states forbade 
advertising, display or dissemination of information about them. Many of these restraints 
were removed in 1965 by the Supreme Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, which 
held that a state prohibition against the use of contraceptive infringed on the fundamental 
rights of married people to make decisions regarding procreation. It was not until 1972, in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, that the Court extended the right to use contraceptives to unmarried 
adults as well.  
As well as being limited by various state policies, access to the birth control pill was 
limited by the age of majority. In addition to conferring various civil rights (e.g. the right to 
vote, the right to enter contracts, serve on juries, sue in court, etc.) the age of majority 
bestowed the right to get medical care – including most procedures, prescriptions and 
surgeries – without parental consent. As the age of majority was 21 in most states – this 
meant that unmarried women could not obtain the birth control pill before that age without 
the knowledge and approval of their parents. During the late 1960s and the 1970s the age of 
majority was lowered from 21 to 18 or 19 in most states, in order to fix legal inconsistencies 
and to follow the precedent of the 26th Amendment to the Constitution.4 Although obtaining 
access at 18 instead of 21 may not seem like a sizable transition, the decisions women make 
during these years regarding their human capital investments are critical for their career path, 
making unrestricted access at earlier age highly relevant.5 
To measure college students’ access to the birth control pill, one needs to look at the 
combination of the state policy regarding contraception as well as the legal age of majority.  
                                                
4 The Twenty-sixth Amendment limited the minimum voting age to no more than 18. It was adopted on July 1st, 
1971, as a response to student activism against the Vietnam War and the fact that 18 year olds could be drafted 
to the military, without having the rights to vote. 
5 Using data from the CPS, Bailey (2004) finds that before the pill was released roughly 50 percent of women 
had married and more than 40 percent had conceived by their twenty-first birthdays. This fact further 




This paper follows the definition of unrestricted access constructed by Bailey (2006), which 
indicates whether a student’s legal environment was such that an 18 or 19 year old had 
unrestricted access to the birth control pill. In most cases, gaining unrestricted access was due 
to a change in the legal age of majority, but there were sometimes other legal changes, which 
enabled young women to obtain the birth control pill without parental consent. These include 
mature minor doctrines that allowed legal infants to consent to medical care as long as they 
were mature enough to understand “the nature and the consequences of the treatment” and 
comprehensive family statutes that allowed or did not expressly restrict physicians from 
treating legal minors.  
While the removal of restrictions on the access to birth control is significant it is 
important to keep in mind that the most determined women were most likely able to find a 
way to obtain the pill prior to these legal changes. Edlund and Machado (2009) point out that 
before the changes in the age of majority laws, many states allowed minors to marry, and that 
women could be emancipated through marriage. Hence the introduction of the birth control 
pill should make early marriage more attractive to women. This is supported by their finding, 
which also suggests that early marriages facilitated women’s educational and occupational 
attainments. This suggests that looking at the law changes in age of majority will 
underestimate the total effect of the pill on people’s outcomes. However, the removal of 
access restrictions can be thought of as decreasing the cost of obtaining the pill substantially, 
making it a highly relevant policy change. 
1.3 Data  
1.3.1 The CIRP Freshman Surveys 1968-1980 
The legal changes granting unrestricted access to the pill took place in the period from 
1960 to 1976, with approximately half of the states clustered in the years 1971 and 1972. 
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Thus, investigating the impact of the pill on aspirations and career plans of young women and 
men, requires consistent data going back to at least the 1960s and extending through the 
1970s. 
The primary source of data used in this paper is the Cooperative Institutional Research 
Program’s (CIRP) Freshman Surveys, which have been conducted annually by the UCLA 
Higher Education Research Institute since 1966. Each year, the survey is administered to all 
incoming freshmen at more than 700 colleges and universities. Nearly 90 percent of the 
institutions in the CIRP Freshman Surveys are repeat participants, and, to ensure consistency 
and minimize response bias, each cohort is stratified and weighted to be a nationally 
representative sample of first-time, full-time students entering institutions of higher education 
in each year.6 Most importantly, the surveys provide information on college students’ 
aspirations and expectations in the years the pill becomes readily available. My analysis 
includes surveys from 1968, 1969, and 1972 through 1980. The 1966, 1970 and 1971 surveys 
were not accessible, and the 1967 survey does not include a measure for college selectivity 
and is therefore excluded. I restrict the analysis to students who were between 17 and 19 
years old at the end of their first year of college. Notably, these surveys were quite large; they 
contain around 270,000 students per survey year on average and, pooled across years, almost 
3.5 million students in total. Weighted summary statistics for these data are shown in Table 
1.1.  
The CIRP surveys ask students about their planned major and planned career. In 1968, 
teaching was by far the most commonly planned occupation among freshman women, 
                                                
6 The defined population consists of all “eligible” institutions of higher education listed by the U.S. Office of 
Education in its annual Education Directory. An institution is considered “eligible” if it is functioning at the 
time of the survey and has the equivalent of a first-time entering freshman class of at least 30 students. The data 
is stratified into 37 cells based on institution’s characteristics. The data is weighted by these stratification cells 
to account for disproportionate sampling. Moreover the weights adjust for less than 100% participation of 





followed by nursing, clerical occupation, and social work (Table 1.2.a). While these 
occupations continued to be very popular in 1980, they were by no means as dominant as 
before, and the top ten careers included law, medicine and business. A similar trend can be 
seen in the planned majors among women (Table 1.2.b). In contrast to the stark changes in 
women’s career aspirations, the top ten planned careers and college majors of male college 
freshmen changed only slightly (Tables 1.3.a and 1.3.b). While the drop in popularity of 
secondary school teaching is notable,  careers such as engineer, business executive, lawyer, 
physician, accountant, and scientific researcher remained at the top of the list. In the 
empirical analysis I examine the role of the birth control pill in the changed career plans of 
college freshmen, separating the effect by level of academic ability, race, and family income.  
While aptitude is not observed, there are two measures of academic achievement 
available in the CIRP surveys which can be used as proxies for students’ underlying abilites: 
high school GPA, and college selectivity. The college selectivity measure is a categorical 
variable based on where colleges are grouped by the median SAT composite scores of the 
entering class, and takes one of  six values: very high, high, medium, low selectivity and no 
selectivity.7 Both aptitude measures are imperfect and each gives a somewhat different 
picture of students’ abilities: the correlation between high school grades and college 
selectivity is only .234. However, both measures are likely to provide partial indication of 
students’ academic ability.8  
Students are divided into high, medium and low ability groups. Using the high school 
grade point average, the high ability group includes students with A+, A and A-, the medium 
                                                
7 The approximate range of mean SAT scores of students entering institutions with low selectivity is 999 or less, 
1,000 – 1,149 for medium selectivity, 1,150 – 1,249 for high, and 1,250 or higher for institutions that are very 
highly selective. 
8 In addition, there is the possibility that these measures could be endogenous, as the pill may encourage people 
to work hard in high school and apply to more selective institutions. This issue is discussed further in Section 
4.3. As seen in Appendix 4 and 5, access to the birth control pill does not have a significant effect on the overall 
distribution of grades or college selectivity in the sample. 
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are students with B+, B and B-, and the low ability are those with Cs and Ds. For college 
selectivity, institutions with high and very high selectivity are combined into one group, and 
institutions with no selectivity or missing selectivity are placed with the low selectivity 
group.9 
The surveys include categorical information on students’ family income. Unfortunately 
the income brackets vary between surveys, making it impossible to get comparable income 
distribution for different cohorts. However, I am able to construct a High Income Group 
defined as those with annual income of $20,000 or more in the 1968 Survey. I then use the 
CPI to calculate approximately equivalent cutoff points for the other surveys. In each year 
approximately 11% of the sample is in the High Income Group.  
Other variables used in the analysis include whether individual is catholic, parents’ level 
of education and whether mother is a housewife. Bailey (2006) looks at whether state-level 
characteristics are predictive of the timing of the legal change that enabled young unmarried 
women to obtain the pill without parental concept. The only characteristic that had a 
significant effect was the fraction of Catholics, which was found to delay the legal changes. 
The control-dummy for being a Catholic is included in the analysis to address this concern. 
Although it is unlikely that parents’ educational level and employment status vary with the 
liberalization of pill access, I include dummies for parents’ college degrees, and whether 
mother is a housewife, as parental outcomes (in particular of the same-sex parent) are found 
to be highly predictive of their children’s outcomes (see e.g. Eccles and Hoffman, 1984 and 
Marini and Brinton, 1984). 
                                                
9 The results are robust to dropping observations with missing selectivity. 
10 
 
1.3.2 Occupational Measures: The 1970 Census 
In the analysis each occupation in the CIRP survey is characterized by linking it to 
outcome variables obtained from the 1970 Census. These outcome measures are based on the 
notion that college freshmen consider the current occupation’s characteristics when choosing 
their planned career: 
Average Income: Expected income is likely to be one of the most relevant observed 
characterisic, affecting peoples’ career choices. The average income is calculated for each 
occupation, among currently employed college graduate. I look at income rather than wages, 
and focus on individuals currently employed, which I believe is a good proxy for the 
perceived benefits of entering a particular occupation.10 Including those who are not 
employed, but excluding the population over 60 years old, gives similar results.  
Siegel Prestige Score: The second outcome variable is the Siegel occupational prestige 
score, which is based on series of surveys conducted at the National Opinion Research 
Center, where respondents were asked to evaluate either “general standing” or “social 
standing” of occupations. The surveys were conducted from 1963 to 1965 and are therefore 
likely to capture young people’s sentiment towards various occupations before the diffusion 
of the birth control pill among young women.  
Share of Males: The last outcome variable is the proportion of men within a particular 
occupation. The measure is constructed using college graduates who are already working in 
the 1970 Census. In the period studied here, the labor market was highly segregated by sex. 
Young women tended to aspire to occupations in which a high percentage of the incumbents 
where women, and young men to occupations were men were more dominant (see Jacobs, 
1989 and Marini and Brinton, 1984). It is likely that the occupational sex segregation was 
                                                
10 The biggest difference between average income and average wages is for professions like lawyers, doctors 




partly driven by women choosing occupations that were more flexible, and required less 
training and less labor market attachment than many of the typical male occupations, the 
introduction of the birth control pill may lead women towards choosing more male dominated 
occupations. 
A list of occupations and the associated outcome variables are in Appendix 2. While these 
measures are correlated, each adds to the insight of people’s career plans, by measuring 
different aspects of the occupations.11 In particular it is noteworthy that business related 
occupations such as management and sales are associated with high incomes, and high male 
ratio, but relatively low prestige scores.  
1.3.3 Cohorts’ Actual Careers: The 1980, 1990 and 2000 Censuses 
 While there is evidence that the characteristics of planned careers are predictive of actual 
outcomes (see e.g. Marini, 1980: Sewell, Hauser and Wolf, 1980; Marini and Fan, 1997; 
Cullinan, 1989), it is possible that changes in planned occupations do not translate into 
changed career outcomes. The CIRP Surveys do not follow students into the labor market, so 
to investigate career outcomes I use the 5% Public Use Microdata Samples of the 1980, 1990 
and 2000 Censuses.  
The effect on actual outcomes in the Census Data may paint a different picture than the 
effect on career plans for several reasons. While some may face obstacles that prevent them 
from reaching their goals, others may simply change their minds somewhere along the way. 
Another noteworthy factor is the change in setting between the CIRP analysis and the Census 
analysis. When looking at career plans in the Freshmen Surveys, one is comparing students 
who at that point in time have unrestricted access to the birth control pill to those who do not. 
In the Census Data, the comparison is between people who obtained unrestricted access to the 
                                                
11 For the occupations listed in Appendix 2, the correlation between average income and male ratio is .737, 
between average income and prestige .471 and between prestige and male ratio is .196. 
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birth control pill before they were 18 years old, to those who obtain unrestricted access after 
their 18 year old birthday. Hence the treatment effect in the Census analysis is not as clear as 
in the results for the college freshmen. On the other hand, the Census Data contains the 
earliest cohorts which gained access to the birth control pill. As Bailey (2009) points out, the 
pill is likely to have had a bigger effect early on, when abortion was still illegal and the pill 
not as acceptable for young women as it became later on. Hence including the earlier cohorts 
may lead to bigger effect of unrestricted access than when only observing the later cohorts. 
The Census analysis includes the 1942-1958 birth cohorts. The Census Data does not 
have information on state of college attended or state of residence during the diffusion of the 
birth control pill, so it is therefore assumed that people attended college or resided in their 
reported states of birth.12 The Census person weights are used to obtain nationally 
representative statistics and results.  
In the same way as for the planned careers in the CIRP Surveys, the actual career 
outcomes for employed individuals is matched with the corresponding occupational 
measures. As before, the outcome variables are calculated using employed individuals in the 
1970 Census. Furthermore, I look at the effect on whether individual is employed and the 
effect on her actual income (in 1999 USD). To see whether the pill affected the college 
population, I estimate the effect on having at least one year of college education and the 
effect on having a college degree. Otherwise the analysis focuses on the sample that has at 
least one year of college, as to make it comparable to the results for the college freshmen.  
                                                
12 The 1967-1960 CIRP Surveys have information on state of birth as well as state of college. 62.7% of 17-19 




1.4 A Few Hypotheses on the Effects of Increased Access to Birth 
Control 
This paper looks at how access to the pill affects young people’s career plans. Each 
occupation is linked with associated characteristics; average income of people in that 
occupation, the share of males within the occupation, and its prestige score. The idea is that 
college students choose between two types of careers. In a Type I occupation, experience and 
aptitude have a negligible effect on wages, human capital does not depreciate and the only 
cost of labor market detachment is due to foregone earnings. These occupations would be 
associated with relatively low income, low prestige scores and low shares of males.  In a Type 
II occupation earnings increase in career ability and experience, human capital depreciates if 
the individual leaves the job market, and early career interruptions are especially detrimental. 
These occupations can be thought of as jobs that require college education, or jobs that 
require intensive training and labor market attachment, such as law and medicine. Type II 
occupations are assumed to be associated with relatively high wages, high prestige scores and 
high shares of males.  A variety of arguments can be used to predict the possible effect of 
increased access to the birth control pill on people’s careers’ decisions. 
1.4.1 The Power of the Pill: Women 
 When discussing the effect of the pill on labor market outcomes and human capital 
investments, the main focus is typically on the increased control that women gain over their 
lives. As they were able to control and time their fertility more accurately, women’s human 
capital investments become more profitable and the pay-off less uncertain than before.           
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As the main effect of earlier access to the birth control pill found on fertility is on the 
timing of births, the benefits of the pill must come from delaying family responsibilities.13 
Light and Ureta (1995) find that the timing of labor market experience can account for 12 
percent of the male-female wage gap, and Miller (2008) finds that delaying motherhood can 
substantially increase career earnings. Delaying career interruptions may be beneficial for 
several reasons. Women who exit the labor market early may miss out on training and 
promotion opportunities, the ability to adopt new skills and acquire human capital may 
decrease with age, and women with more seniority may be in a better position to protect their 
human capital assets when leaving their careers temporarily. By making it less costly to delay 
fertility the birth control pill may affect women’s career choices by increasing the returns to 
their human capital investments.14 
As women tend to spend more time out of the labor force than men, they are more likely 
to opt for jobs where experience has negligible effect on wages and the main cost of absence 
is due to forgone earnings. This is consistent with the findings in the data that women in the 
sample have significantly higher grades than the men, they tend to cluster into occupations 
such as teaching, nursing and clerical jobs, associated with relatively low income and flat 
wage curves.  
Although the most direct effect of increased access to contraceptives is through the effect 
on fertility, it is possible that the pill also had an effect on people’s career plans in a more 
indirect way. One angle from which to view the impact of the pill is how it may have 
changed incentives for sexual behavior. For example, access to the pill made sex less risky 
(and thus less costly) for women. Assuming that women supply sex and men demand it, this 
                                                
13 While Bailey (2004) finds no effect on early access to the birth control pill on total fertility, she finds that it 
significantly reduces the likelihood of a first birth before age 22. 
14 See a more detailed discussion and a framework in Miller (2008). 
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may have led to reduced transfers from men to women.15 This could also have happened in 
the form of reduced commitment, when engaging in premarital sex. Akerlof et al. (1996) 
relate the abatement of shotgun marriages to the legalization of abortion and increased 
availability of contraception to unmarried women, and show that the decline in shotgun 
marriages accounts for a significant fraction of increased out-of-wedlock first births. On the 
one hand this may push women towards more profitable careers to compensate for the 
reduced transfer. However, the payoff for investing in a career may also become significantly 
lower as they face increased risk of bearing the consequences of untimely pregnancy by 
themselves, decreasing the incentive to make human capital investments.   
While the cheaper sex mechanism may increase the probability of a woman choosing a 
high-salary occupation, it differs fundamentally in its implications for female welfare. While 
the fertility mechanism argues that the birth control pill empowered women and enabled them 
to aim for a professional career, which would have been too costly before, the cheaper sex 
mechanism claims that women may possibly invest more in human capital because the pill 
made them worse off.  
The birth control pill may have played a role in supporting the feminism revival and the 
sexual revolution of the 1960’s and 1970’s.16 Hence some of the power of the pill may come 
through more amiable views towards women who pursue higher education and engage in 
more competitive careers, than was previously customary. As more emphasis was placed on 
women’s independence and equality with men, one could again expect to see women move 
towards Type II occupations associated with higher income, higher male ratios and more 
prestige. I use survey questions regarding attitudes towards married women in the labor force 
                                                
15 See e.g. Trivers (1972), Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996), Edlund (1998) and Edlund and Korn (2002). 
16 Feminism revival refers to the feminism activity in the early 1960s and lasting through the late 1980s. First-
wave feminism refers to the feminism activity focused on equal contract and property rights for women during 
the 19th century and early 20th century.  
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to investigate whether access to the pill affected students’ views on gender equality, and find 
that men and women become less likely to agree with the statement: “The activities of 
married women are best confined to the home and family”, although the effect is only 
significant for those in highly selective colleges. 
1.4.2 The Power of the Pill: Men 
 While largely left unexplored in the empirical literature, the theory suggests that 
increased access to birth control may have affected men through delayed fertility and 
marriage, in a similar way as women.17 As Akerlof et al. (1996) have pointed out, when 
having a child became a women’s choice, the pressure to marry in the event of pregnancy 
diminished, and men increasingly had the social choice to focus on their education and 
careers. Overall, the expected effect of increased access to the birth control pill through 
delayed family responsibilities is increased investment in human capital and increased 
probability of choosing occupations associated with higher wages, higher male ratios and 
higher prestige, i.e. Type II occupations.  
If marriage is thought of as a contract between men and women, where men compensate 
women for reproductive sex and foregone market earnings, as detailed in Edlund and Korn 
(2002), then the pill may have made wives more expensive (and better off), motivating men 
to obtain higher wages than before. On the other hand, as pointed out above, it may have 
made premarital sex cheaper - reducing men’s transfers to women and their commitment in 
the event of untimely pregnancy. 
                                                
17 A notable exception is Hock (2008) who looks at the effect of unconstrained access to the pill on men’s and 
women’s college enrollment. He finds that unconstrained access to the pill increased female college enrollment 
rates and reduced the dropout rate. While he finds no direct effect of the pill on men, he finds an indirect effect 
of women’s delayed fertility. Arguing that men would be affected through their spouses’ delayed fertility and 
pointing out that men usually date slightly younger women, he observes the effect of access to the birth control 
pill on men’s cohorts that are 1-3 years older than the affected female cohorts, and finds that men’s college 




Furthermore, changed social norms due to the feminism revival and sexual revolution 
could have influenced men’s aspirations as well as women’s. While the feminism revival 
should have weakened the distinction between men’s and women’s occupations, it is also 
possible that the inflow of women into specific occupations may have made them less 
desirable or attainable for men. 
1.4.3 The Effect of the Pill by Academic Ability 
 In the empirical analysis, I separate the effect of increased access to the birth control pill 
by academic ability, measured by college selectivity and high school grades. In the 
framework presented by Goldin and Katz (2002) women with low academic ability do not 
invest in their human capital whether they have access to the pill or not. These women lose 
through worse marriage outcomes, while the benefits are agglomerated at the higher end of 
the distribution.  
Another reason for separating the effect by ability is that the pill may have affected the 
decision to go to college and hence changed the college population. As the CIRP data only 
includes college students, it is important to consider how unrestricted access to the pill may 
have affected sample selection. Access to birth control may have affected decisions to go to 
college, and indeed Hock (2007) finds that unconstrained access to the pill increased female 
college enrollment rates by over two percentage points. It is reasonable to believe that the 
effects of the pill on the college-going population would come through lowering the aptitude 
of the marginal college student. The effect of increased access to the pill on low aptitude 
students may hence be in the opposite direction due to the selection into the college sample as 
those who enter college due to unrestricted access to the birth control pill are more likely to 
have a lower underlying ability and hence be more likely to choose an occupation from Type 




To check whether the observed ability level of the college population changed with less 
restricted access to the birth control pill, I look at how it affects the high school grade 
distribution of college freshmen, the distribution of college selectivity, and the grade 
distribution within college type.  As seen in Appendix 3 and 4, access to the pill does not 
have any significant effect on the distribution of students’ college selectivity, and while there 
is some indication that it may have affected the grade distribution, the effect disappears when 
the usual control variables are included. Additionally the results from the Census Data 
suggest that access to the pill had little effect on college enrollment or college graduation (see 
Table 1.10). Surprisingly, there is a marginal negative effect on the ratio of white women 
who have at least one year of college.    
1.4.4 The Effect of the Pill by Race 
There are several reasons for why one might expect to see different effects for white 
students and non-whites. Discrimination may affect the benefits from human capital 
investments. While discrimination could lead to lower benefits from human capital 
investment, and hence less response among minorities, Arcidiacono et al. (2010) find that 
while blacks face a wage penalty in the high school labor market this is not true for the 
college labor market. If there is less discrimination for those who invest more in their human 
capital, then blacks may be more likely to respond to a decrease in the cost of human capital 
investments.  
The number of unwanted pregnancies decreased by 36 percent between the first and 
second half of the 1960s and the reduction was the greatest among blacks and women with 
little education.18 Looking at the effects of abortion legalization, Angrist and Evans (1996) 
find while the responses of white women were modest, black women experienced large 
                                                
18 See Jaffe (1973) and Cutright and Jaffe (1976) 
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reductions in teen fertility and teen out-of-wedlock fertility, leading to increased schooling 
and employment rates. 
The restrictions on access are likely to have been more binding for minority groups and 
the underprivileged. It appears that the restrictions on access were enforced most effectively 
in birth control clinics, which mainly served disadvantaged minority groups and those with 
low income. Those who could afford to visit a private physician probably had less difficulty 
obtaining the birth control pill if determined to do so.19 As the control for family income is 
quite crude, only allowing the highest income bracket to be separated from the others, the 
race variable could be capturing the effect of being from lower income families as well. 
1.5 Data Analysis and Regression Results 
1.5.1 Planned Careers 
The objective of this study is to examine whether unrestricted access to the pill induced 
college students to shift their career aspirations. To do so I estimate the following reduced 
form specification: 
Yisc = !s+ !c + "PILLsc  + #Xisc + $isc  (1), 
where Yisc is the outcome of interest for individual i in state s and cohort c, and !s and !c are, 
respectively, state and cohort fixed effects. PILLsc is an indicator variable for whether an 
individual in state s and cohort c had unrestricted access to the pill when starting college, as 
described in Section 1.2. The variable used here is the same as used in Bailey (2006) (See 
Appendix 1). Xisc includes controls for race, high school grades, and college selectivity. It 
also includes dummy variables for whether a student is catholic, whether the student’s parents 
have a college degree, and whether the student’s mother is a housewife. Standard errors are 
                                                
19 See Choper (1984) 
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clustered by state to reflect the nature of the variation in access to the pill. To address 
concerns that the parameter of interest is capturing social trends or other gradually evolving, 
unobserved state characteristics, I add state specific time trends. For robustness, I also add a 
control for abortion legalization.20  
For all college-going women, I find no significant effects of access to the pill on the 
characteristics of women’s planned careers (Table 1.4, top panel). For men, there is a 
significant effect on aspirations toward occupations with higher share of males (Table 1.4, 
bottom panel). While the results indicate no overall relationship between the pill and career 
aspirations of all college-going women, the discussion above suggests we might expect 
differential effects for students of different career abilities and different ethnicity groups.  
To examine the heterogeneity in the effect of the pill, the regression equation takes the 
following form: 
Yisc = !s+ !c + %"apt(Apti&PILLsc)  + #Xisc + $ics  (2), 
where " is now a vector with one value for each group.  
 
Academic Ability 
Table 1.5 shows the results for women, where I examine each measure of ability (college 
selectivity and high school GPA) separately. When women are separated by college 
selectivity, women from the top end of the distribution with access to the pill are moving into 
careers associated with higher income, higher prestige scores and higher male ratios. When 
separated by grades, women with low grades are moving into occupations with less prestige, 
lower income and lower male ratios. This effect on women with low grades may suggest 
                                                
20 I consider abortion to be available in 1971 in Alaska, Hawaii, New York and Washington where abortion by 
request was then legalized, and in California, which had very lenient policy and is usually grouped with the 
repeal states (see e.g. Donohue and Levitt, 2001 and Angrist and Evans, 1999). In the rest of the states abortion 
is considered to become available in 1974, following the Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion nationally on 
the grounds of constitutional right to privacy. Assuming that the Roe v. Wade decision becomes effective in 
1973 does not change the results from the analysis. 
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negative selection on the college attendance margin. Another reason for the negative effect on 
this group of women may be increased competition, as low ability women may possibly find 
it harder to pursue careers such as law and medicine when faced with more competition from 
women in the high ability group. As discussed above there may also be a negative effect on 
those women who want children, or the ones who do not want to use contraceptives, e.g. for 
moral reasons. It is possible that these women come disproportionately from the lower end of 
the ability distribution.21  
When the effect on men’s career plans is separated by their college selectivity, the main 
effect is on those in medium institutions. Their plans shift to careers associated with higher 
income and higher male ratios. Men from low institutions also move towards more male 
dominated occupations. On the other hand, they move to occupations with significantly lower 
prestige scores. When separated by grades, the effects are significant for men from the 
medium and low group, who tend towards careers with higher male ratios but lower prestige 
score (Table 1.6).  The opposite effect on prestige and male ratios could be explained with 
movement into business occupations. As can be seen in Appendix 2, occupations such as 
management, accounting and sales are associated with relatively high male ratios, but low 
prestige scores.  
The effect of unrestricted access to the pill on men is important and interesting, as they 
have hitherto mostly been neglected in the literature. It may raise the concern that the 
instrument is capturing something else. One possibility is that the age of majority affects 
career plans through other mechanisms, such as the ability to enter a contract and get a loan 
to invest in education. In Appendix 3, the changes in age of majority are separated from other 
                                                




law changes, when looking at men’s outcomes.22 While the age of majority is driving the 
increase in average income of men’s planned careers, the movement towards more male 
dominated occupations is affected by other legal changes as well as changes in the age of 
majority. Hence, while it may be possible that other factors related to the lowered legal age of 
majority account for some of the results, they cannot account for the overall effect.   
 
Race 
In Table 1.7, men’s and women’s outcomes are separated by their race. For women (see 
top panel) the main effect is on blacks and other non-white women, who move to occupations 
associated with higher income, higher prestige scores and higher shares of males.  
Similarly among men (Table 1.7, bottom panel) the main effect is on blacks and men 
from other non-white ethnicity groups. These men move to occupations associated with 
higher income, higher prestige scores and higher shares of males. There is also a significant 
and positive effect on the share of males in occupations chosen by white men with 
unrestricted access to the pill. As was discussed in Section 1.4.4, one could expect the effect 
of increased access to the pill to be more predominant among racial minorities. In order to get 
a better picture of the differences between white and non-white students I then separate the 
effect by both race and academic ability. I.e. I estimate equation (2) separately for each racial 
group. Table 1.8 shows the results for women. In the top panel they are separated by their 
college selectivity and in the bottom panel, by their high school grades. As can be seen in the 
Table 1.8 women in highly selective colleges shift their career aspirations towards careers 
associated with higher average income and higher prestige scores. For white women the 
effect for low ability women is in the opposite direction, explaining the overall non-
significant effect for white women in Table 1.7. On the other hand, there is no significant 
                                                
22 Other law changes include mature minor doctrines, comprehensive family statutes and changes at the 
Supreme Court Level. 
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effect on low-ability black women. For both white and black men (Table 1.9), the main effect 
is on those in medium selective colleges, as they move towards occupations associated with 
higher income and higher male ratios. 
 
Changed Characteristics of College Students 
 While the CIRP Freshman Surveys cannot be used to look at the effect on the decision to 
go to college, it is possible to look at whether pill access is associated with certain changes in 
the observed characteristics of college students. Appendix 4 presents estimates of the effect 
of unrestricted pill access on the overall grade distribution as well as the grade distribution 
within different types of institutions, and Appendix 5 shows the effect on overall college 
selectivity and separately for students with different high school grades. These estimations 
include state and cohort fixed effects, as well as state specific time trend and control for 
abortion legalization. I first estimate the effect without additional controls to see whether the 
pill had an effect on the observed ability distribution of students. The findings suggest a 
marginally significant positive effect on the high school grades of women in institutions with 
low selectivity, and a marginally significant negative effect on the high school grades of men 
in medium selective colleges. These effects disappear when the additional controls, used in 
previous regressions, are included, which indicates that these controls are likely effective in 
correcting for the effect that the pill may have had on the selection into different types of 
colleges.  
 
1.5.2 The Role of Feminism and Changed Gender Role Views 
 As discussed in Section 1.4, one mechanism through which the pill may have worked is 
the feminism revival and changed social norms. To capture the effect of unrestricted access to 
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the birth control pill on young people’s attitudes, I look at a question from the CIRP surveys 
where students are asked whether they agree with the statement: “The activities of married 
women are best confined to the home and family”. The question is only available in the 
surveys after 1971, so the analysis includes the 1972-1980 freshman cohorts.23 I run both a 
logit regression, where the dependent variable takes value one if an individual somewhat 
agrees, or strongly agrees with the statement, and an ordered logit, where the dependent 
variable has values 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (somewhat disagree), 3 (somewhat agree), and 4 
(strongly agree). As seen in Table 1.10, the pill is associated with a negative effect on both 
men and women agreement with the statement about married women being confined to the 
home and family, although it is only significant for students from the most selective 
institutions. This corresponds to the results for planned careers, in particular for women, and 
suggests that the effect of increased access to birth control may have been partly correlated 
with changed attitudes towards women’s labor market participation.  
1.5.3 The Effect on Actual Career Outcomes 
 To examine young people’s actual career outcomes Equation (1) is estimated, using data 
on occupations from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Censuses. In addition to access to the pill, the 
specification includes controls for race, access to abortion, state and cohort fixed effects and a 
state specific time trend. Early access to the birth control pill is based on law changes that 
enabled 18 to 21 year old women to obtain the pill without parental consent. Goldin and Katz 
(2002) compare women who have access before 21 to those who do not have access until 
they are 21 or older, while Bailey (2006) looks at the effect of having access before or after 
eighteen. Table 1.11 and Table 1.12 report estimates using access to the pill at age 18 but 
                                                





using access at 21 leads to similar results. In addition to occupational characteristics I look at 
the effect of having at least on year of college and on having a college degree (Table 1.11), 
and the effect on being employment, and on actual income, measured in 1999 USD (Table 
1.12).  
The results in Table 1.11 suggest there is little effect on college enrollment and college 
completion. The Census Data allows me to look at the effect of the pill by ethnicity groups. 
However I cannot separate the effect by ability or by family income as in the previous 
analysis. There is a marginally significant negative effect on white women and men from 
“other” ethnicity groups, having at least one year of college, and on men from “other” 
ethnicity groups who have finished college. It suggests that the selection mechanism may not 
be of great importance when explaining the effect on the college freshmen.  
The results on actual career outcomes for women (Table 1.12, top panel) are inconsistent 
with the findings in the Freshmen Surveys, as white women seem to be positively affected, 
while black women are negatively affected. White women who had access to the pill before 
age of 18, have occupations associated with higher income and higher male ratios. 
Furthermore, they have significantly higher actual income. On the other hand black women, 
who had access to the pill before they became 18, have occupations associated with lower 
average income and lower prestige score. They also have lower actual income.24 As Goldin 
(2006) notes, changes in labor market behavior are preceded by changes in expectations. 
Among black women it appears that the shift in career plans towards more career oriented 
occupations did not translate into better labor market outcomes. One possibility is that they 
were crowded out as men and white women also shifted their aspirations towards better paid 
occupations. The difference may also be partly due to differences in the data. The freshmen 
                                                
24  Excluding the early cohorts, and only looking at the same cohorts as I have in the CIRP surveys, leads to the 
same results. Furthermore, the effect on career plans, using the Freshmen Surveys are robust to only including 
the controls available in the Census analysis. 
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surveys compare people who at that point in time did or did not have access to the birth 
control pill, while the Census looks at those who had unrestricted access to the pill before 
versus after 18. The treatment is thus weaker in the Census analysis, and furthermore the 
estimated effect is more likely to suffer measurement errors, as it has to be assumed that 
women live in the same state as they did when they were 18. 
The results suggest that on average both men and women move towards occupations 
associated with higher average income and higher male ratio. As for women, when separated 
by race, the effect on black men is in the opposite direction. However, when looking at the 
actual income, men in all racial groups are positively and significantly affected by early 
access to the birth control pill.  
The results in the Census Data support the previous findings, in that men were 
significantly affected by increased access to the birth control pill. Looking at the effect on 
people’s actual income it appears that they were the ones that really gained from the pill.  
1.6 Concluding Remarks 
The introduction of the pill in 1960 undoubtedly played a role in the changed social 
norms regarding genders’ roles at home and in the workplace. By the mid-1960s a third of all 
married women in the U.S. had used an oral contraceptive, and by the late 1960s the majority 
of American women had taken the pill (see Marks, 2001). The prompt take-up of the pill 
accentuates the strong desire for such a contraceptive. It was promoted as being almost 100 
percent effective, giving women greater control over fertility than ever before. However, by 
diminishing the risk of pregnancy, the birth control pill may have undermined a powerful tool 
women had previously possessed to deny sexual intercourse before marriage and hence 
enabled men to become more detached and non-committed in their sexual relationships. In 
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this way the increased access to a reliable contraceptive may have benefited men while some 
women may have become worse off than before. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the effect of the birth control pill in three ways. 
First it shows how unrestricted access to the birth control pill significantly affected the 
expectations and career plans of college freshmen. Secondly it shows how the effect of the 
pill varied for different groups of people: the main effect appears to be on non-white 
minorities. While high ability women, across all racial groups, shifted their career aspirations 
towards occupations with higher wages, higher occupational scores and higher male ratios, 
the opposite is true for low ability white women. Thirdly, the study shows that men’s career 
plans were affected by increased access to the birth control pill as well as women’s, as their 
aspirations shifted towards traditionally male dominated occupations, across all ability 
groups. As aspirations at college entry may be more malleable than actual labor market 
outcomes the analysis is extended by looking at actual career outcomes in the Census Data. 
There I also find an effect of early access to the birth control pill on both men and women. 
Those with early access are more likely to be in occupations associated with higher pay and 
higher male ratios, compared to those with later access. In addition, men who had early 
access to the birth control pill have significantly higher actual income across all ethnicity 
groups. 
For women of high academic ability, the results in the paper support the empirical 
literature, which focuses on the positive effect on women’s labor market participation and 
human capital investments. But, they also indicate that some women may have been 
adversely affected. Furthermore the results in the paper emphasize the importance of bringing 
men into the picture when looking at the impact of policies that affect the relationship 
between labor market activities and household production. While the theoretical literature has 
discussed the relationship between fertility and labor market outcomes from the intra-
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household perspective – focusing on both men and women – there has been ample need for 
further investigation on the empirical side. Not only are men apt to indirect effects through 
the marriage market and bargaining outcomes within the household, but they are also likely 
to experience non-trivial, direct effects, e.g. through significantly delayed family 
responsibilities. The results in this paper are in line with the predictions of the theoretical 
literature, indicating that men were in fact affected by increased access to fertility controls, 







Table 1.1.  Summary Statistics (CIRP Freshman Surveys 1968-1969, 1972-1980) 
 
  Restricted access to pill Unrestricted access to pill 
Number of obs. 645,238  2,663,165  
Male 55.2%  50.4%  
Race:     
 White 85.2%  82.4%  
 Black 9.2  10.3  
 Other 5.5  7.3  
Catholic 27.8  20.4  
High Income Household 12.0  10.8  
Father has a Bachelor Degree 25.0  30.0  
Mother has a Bachelor Degree 13.2  14.8  
Mother is a Housewife 46.3  29.8  
High School Grades:     
 High (As) 13.6  18.1  
 Medium (Bs) 54.3  58.9  
 Low (Cs and Ds) 32.1  23.0  
College Selectivity     
 High 17.8  12.6  
 Medium 14.4  19.4  
 Low, No 67.8  68.0  
Notes: The income brackets vary between survey years. In the 1968 survey I define high income as annual 
income of $20,000 or more. I then use the CPI to calculate approximately equivalent cutoff points for the 
other surveys. Survey weights are used in order to make the statistics nationally representative for first 






Table 1.2.a  Top Ten Planned Careers Among Women in the CIRP Freshman Surveys 
Rank 1968   1980  
1 Elementary Teacher 19.2%  Business Executive 9.5% 
2 Secondary Teacher 17.5  Nurse 8.8 
3 Nurse 6.4  Elementary Teacher 6.8 
4 Clerical 5.5  Accountant 6.3 
5 Social Worker 5.1  Computer Programmer 4.8 
6 Artist 2.5  Clerical 3.7 
7 Therapist 2.1  Therapist 3.4 
8 Writer/Journalist 2.0  Lawyer 3.3 
9 Computer Programmer 1.8  Social Worker 3.2 
10 Housewife 1.7  Physician 2.9 
Notes: Survey weights are used in order to make the statistics nationally representative for first time 




Table 1.2.b  Top Ten College Majors Among Women in the CIRP Freshman Surveys 
Rank 1968   1980  
1 Education 15.9%  Education 11.4% 
2 English, Language and Lit. 10.6  Nursing 8.5 
3 Secreterial Studies 6.3  Accounting 6.6 
4 Nursing 6.3  Business Adm. 6.0 
5 Psychology 5.2  Computer Science 4.5 
6 Arts 4.8  Secreterial Studies 4.3 
7 Home Economics 4.0  Management 3.5 
8 Mathematics 4.0  Psychology 3.3 
9 Social Work 3.6  Engineering 3.1 
10 Phsyical 
Education/Recreation 
3.4  Health Technology 3.2 
Notes: Survey weights are used in order to make the statistics nationally representative for first time 








Table 1.3.a  Top Ten Planned Careers Among Men in the CIRP Freshman Surveys 





2 Secondary Teacher 9.9  Business Executive 11.6 
3 Business Executive 7.8  Accountant 5.8 
4 Lawyer 6.9  Computer Programmer 5.7 
5 Physician 5.8  Lawyer 4.6 
6 Scientific Researcher 5.2  Physician 4.2 
7 Accountant 3.5  Business Owner/Proprietor 4.2 
8 Architect 2.5  Architect 2.4 
9 Computer Programmer 2.3  Scientific Researcher 2.3 
10 Business Owner/Proprietor 2.0  Secondary Teacher 1.9 
Notes: Survey weights are used in order to make the statistics nationally representative for first time 
incoming college students. 
 
 
Table 1.3.b  Top Ten College Majors Among Men in the CIRP Freshman Surveys 





2 Business Adm. 12.2  Business Adm. 8.2 
3 Accounting 4.2  Accounting 6.4 
4 Prelaw 3.9  Management 5.7 
5 Mathematics 3.6  Computer Science 5.5 
6 Premedical 3.6  Premedical 3.6 
7 Physicial 
Education/Recreation 
3.3  Education 3.3 
8 Political Science 2.9  Agriculture 2.4 
9 History 2.8  Communications 2.2 
10 Architecture 2.4  Political Science 2.2 
Notes: Prelaw was not on the list of possible majors in the 1980 survey. Survey weights are used in 
order to make the statistics nationally representative for first time incoming college students.      







Table 1.4.  Early Access to Birth Control and the  
Planned Careers of All College Freshmen 
 
  Mean of Dep. 
Variable 
 Women  
   (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome Variable     
 Average Income 11,388 72.5 82.3 54.4 
   (107.7) (116.2) (140.3) 
 Siegel Prestige Score 58.7 -.332 -.320 -.165 
   (.261) (.267) (.280) 
 Share of Males 0.555 .004 .003 .005 
   (.006) (.006) (.007) 
Specificaton     
 Additional Controls  " " " 
 Abortion Control   " " 
 State Specific Time Trend    " 
Observations  1,013,521 1,013,521 1,013,521 
  Mean of Dep. 
Variable 
 Men  
   (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome Variable     
 Average Income 15,117 127.1 160.7 103.6 
   (109.4) (112.4) (120.9) 
 Siegel Prestige Score 61.8 -.454* -.397 -.232 
   (.257) (.247) (.266) 
 Share of Males 0.858 .015*** .016*** .016*** 
   (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Specificaton     
 Additional Controls  " " " 
 Abortion Control   " " 
 State Specific Time Trend    " 
Observations  1,150,093 1,150,093 1,150,093 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). 
All specifications include state fixed effect, college cohort fixed effect, and controls for race. Additional 
controls include dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife, 









Table 1.5.a  The Impact of Early Access to Birth Control Pill on Women’s Planned 
Careers by their College Selectivity 
   Mean of Dep. 
Variable 
Women by College Selectivity 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome Variable      
 Average Income High Select. 12,717 944.9*** 955.9*** 945.9*** 
    (244.4) (240.6) (252.3) 
  Medium Select. 11,427 143.9 154.0 103.4 
    (130.3) (131.9) (146.3) 
  Low, No Select. 11,038 -136.3 -125.7 -143.6 
    (116.2) (124.1) (146.9) 
 Siegel Prestige 
Score 
High Select. 62.0 1.44*** 1.46*** 1.70*** 
    (.396) (.390) (.392) 
  Medium Select. 58.7 -.520* -.506* -.251 
    (.302) (.300) (.272) 
  Low, No Select. 57.9 -.674** -.659** -.529* 
    (.291) (.295) (.294) 
 Share of Males High Select. 0.616 .036** .035** .034** 
    (.014) (.014) (.016) 
  Medium Select. 0.557 .003 .002 .003 
    (.009) (.009) (.011) 
  Low, No Select. 0.540 -.003 -.004 .000 
    (.007) (.007) (.008) 
Specificaton      
 Additional Controls   " " " 
 Abortion Control    " " 
 State Specific Time 
Trend 
    " 
Observations   1,013,521 1,013,521 1,013,521 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). All 
specifications include state fixed effect, college cohort fixed effect, and controls for race. Additional controls 
include dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife, individual is 






Table 1.5.b  The Impact of Early Access to Birth Control Pill on Women’s Planned 
Careers by their High School Grades 
 
   Mean of Dep. 
Variable 
Women by High School Grades 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome Variable      
 Average Income High Grades 12,763 288.8 295.1 242.5 
    (230.1) (238.4) (254.9) 
  Medium Grades 11,034 -3.25 3.22 -56.8 
    (90.1) (94.3) (96.5) 
  Low Grades 10,344 -429.9*** -424.7*** -479.0*** 
    (94.6) (99.4) (99.3) 
 Siegel Prestige 
Score 
High Grades 61.0 -.178 -.172 -.147 
    (.407) (.414) (.436) 
  Medium Grades 58.1 -.533** -.527** -.452** 
    (.250) (.252) (.207) 
  Low Grades 57.3 -.788*** -.783*** -.745*** 
    (.226) (.226) (.169) 
 Share of Males High Grades 0.635 -.002 -.003 -.004 
    (.009) (.009) (.009) 
  Medium Grades 0.537 .001 -.000 -.001 
    (.005) (.005) (.006) 
  Low Grades 0.487 -.014** -.014** -.014** 
    (.005) (.005) (.006) 
Specificaton      
 Additional 
Controls 
  " " " 
 Abortion Control    " " 
 State Specific 
Time Trend 
    " 
Observations   1,013,521 1,013,521 1,013,521 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). All 
specifications include state fixed effect, college cohort fixed effect, and controls for race. Additional controls 
include dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife, individual is 






Table 1.6.a  The Impact of Early Access to Birth Control Pill on  
Men’s Planned Careers by their College Selectivity 
 
   Mean of Dep. 
Variable 
Men by College Selectivity 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome Variable      
 Average Income High Select. 13,599 -38.7 -6.86 -30.7 
    (269.6) (269.6) (238.7) 
  Medium Select. 12,714 410.7** 441.7** 319.2 
    (201.2) (204.1) (193.3) 
  Low, No Select. 11,981 101.5 135.7 78.5 
    (118.5) (120.6) (132.1) 
 Siegel Prestige 
Score 
High Select. 68.2 .456 .100 .313 
    (.313) (.315) (.363) 
  Medium Select. 63.2 -.693** -.640** -.537 
    (.324) (.315) (.343) 
  Low, No Select. 59.5 -.523* -.465 -.288 
    (.299) (.288) (.273) 
 Share of Males High Select. 0.887 .006 .007 .003 
    (.005) (.006) (.006) 
  Medium Select. 0.864 .026** .027** .025** 
    (.010) (.011) (.011) 
  Low, No Select. 0.832 .015*** .016*** .017*** 
    (.005) (.006) (.006) 
Specificaton      
 Additional 
Controls 
  " " " 
 Abortion Control    " " 
 State Specific Time Trend    " 
Observations   1,150,093 1,150,093 1,150,093 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). All 
specifications include state fixed effect, college cohort fixed effect, and controls for race. Additional controls 
include dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife, individual is 
catholic, as well as controls for college selectivity and individuals' high school grades. 






Table 1.6.b  The Impact of Early Access to Birth Control Pill on 
 Men’s Planned Careers by their High School Grades 
 
   Mean of Dep. 
Variable 
Men by High School Grades 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome Variable      
 Average Income High Grades 13,491 165.4 191.0 133.5 
    (193.0) (188.3) (188.0) 
  Medium Grades 12,860 -5.90 21.2 -73.1 
    (105.0) (104.1) (101.2) 
  Low Grades 12,279 48.7 72.2 -23.5 
    (98.3) (99.2) (96.0) 
 Siegel Prestige 
Score 
High Grades 67.0 -.916** -.878** -.864** 
    (.404) (.399) (.385) 
  Medium Grades 63.2 -.894*** -.864** -.851*** 
    (.277) (.266) (.238) 
  Low Grades 61.7 -.546** -.512** -.547** 
    (.253) (.238) (.256) 
 Share of Males High Grades 0.889 .005 .006 .005 
    (.003) (.004) (.005) 
  Medium Grades 0.861 .012*** .012*** .002** 
    (.004) (.004) (.005) 
  Low Grades 0.847 .016*** .016*** .015*** 
    (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Specificaton      
 Additional 
Controls 
  " " " 
 Abortion Control    " " 
 State Specific Time Trend    " 
Observations   1,150,093 1,150,093 1,150,093 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). All 
specifications include state fixed effect, college cohort fixed effect, and controls for race. Additional controls 
include dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife, individual is 








Table 1.7.a  The Impact of Early Access to Birth Control Pill on  
Women’s Planned Careers by Race 
   Mean of 
Dep. 
Variable 
Women by Race 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome Variable      
 Average Income White 11,686 -4.86 5.38 -32.4 
    (107.9) (116.3) (142.2) 
  Black 12,901 536.4*** 545.7*** 580.3*** 
    (154.6) (163.3) (171.8) 
  Other 13,009 722.0*** 734.2*** 674.4** 
    (196.9) (208.6) (256.8) 
 Siegel Prestige 
Score 
White 59.6 -.519* -.506* -.359 
    (.263) (.268) (.279) 
  Black 60.5 .813** .826** .963** 
    (.369) (.381) (.421) 
  Other 61.6 1.20*** 1.21*** 1.35*** 
    (.385) (.407) (.466) 
 Share of Males White 0.571 .002 .001 .002 
    (.006) (.007) (.008) 
  Black 0.610 .015 .014 .023** 
    (.011) (.011) (.011) 
  Other 0.619 .029*** .028** .027** 
    (.010) (.011) (.013) 
Specificaton      
 Additional 
Controls 
  " " " 
 Abortion Control    " " 
 State Specific Time Trend    " 
Observations   1,013,521 1,013,521 1,013,521 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** 
p<.01). All specifications include state fixed effect, college cohort fixed effect, and controls for race. 
Additional controls include dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a 





Table 1.7.b  The Impact of Early Access to Birth Control  
Pill on Men’s Planned Careers by Race 
 
   Mean of 
Dep. 
Variable 
Men by Race 
    (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome Variable      
 Average Income White 15,597 65.4 99.6 28.7 
    (111.8) (115.1) (123.4) 
  Black 15,279 654.7*** 687.1*** 817.2*** 
    (153.9) (158.8) (162.4) 
  Other 16,164 691.9*** 732.5*** 717.8*** 
    (171.9) (172.0) (194.2) 
 Siegel Prestige 
Score 
White 63.8 -.590** -.531** -.359 
    (.254) (.242) (.268) 
  Black 62.5 .434 .490 .668** 
    (.278) (.298) (.272) 
  Other 65.2 1.08** 1.15** 1.54*** 
    (.482) (.487) (.472) 
 Share of Males White 0.865 .014*** .015*** .014** 
    (.005) (.005) (.006) 
  Black 0.830 .037*** .038*** .043*** 
    (.007) (.007) (.008) 
  Other 0.872 .017*** .018*** .019*** 
    (.005) (.005) (.007) 
Specificaton      
 Additional Controls  " " " 
 Abortion Control    " " 
 State Specific Time Trend    " 
Observations   1,150,093 1,150,093 1,150,093 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** 
p<.01). All specifications include state fixed effect, college cohort fixed effect, and controls for race. 
Additional controls include dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a 
housewife, individual is catholic, as well as controls for college selectivity and individuals' high 
school grades. 




Table 1.8.a  The Impact of Early Access to Birth Control Pill on  
Women’s Planned Careers by Race and College Selectivity 
 
   Women by Race and College Selectivity 
   (1) (2) (3) 
  Coll. Select. White Black Other 
Outcome Variable     
 Average Income High 672.6*** 819.0** 1013.0* 
   (180.0) (342.7) (526.0) 
  Medium 31.5 666.1** 342.9 
   (102.5) (260.4) (403.4) 
  Low -136.2 66.6 -324.8 
   (101.5) (190.7) (477.9) 
 Siegel Prestige 
Score 
High 16.1*** 21.9*** 20.1* 
   (4.22) (6.83) (11.1) 
  Medium -2.56 1.50 -9.3 
   (3.15) (5.06) (9.33) 
  Low -6.48* -2.69 -15.1 
   (3.60) (3.92) (10.4) 
 Share of Males High 0.38** .027 .034 
   (.016) (.025) (.033) 
  Medium -.001 .053** .023 
   (.011) (.023) (.024) 
  Low -.002 .022 -.011 
   (.008) (.017) (.025) 
      
Observations  869,057 96,936 47,528 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** 
p<.05; *** p<.01). All specifications include state fixed effect, cohort fixed effect, state 
specific time trend and control for abortion legalization. Additional controls include 
dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife, 




Table 1.8.b  The Impact of Early Access to Birth Control Pill on  
Women’s Planned Careers by Race and High School Grades 
 
   Women by Race and High School Grades 
   (1) (2) (3) 
  High School 
Grades 
White Black Other 
Outcome Variable     
 Average Income High 139.7 -84.2 243.4 
   (154.2) (687.4) (607.5) 
  Medium -113.6* 236.5 -86.4 
   (65.8) (177.5) (265.3) 
  Low -392.8*** -37.1 -531.1*** 
   (77.3) (185.9) (170.7) 
 Siegel Prestige 
Score 
High -1.95 -7.80 -8.47 
   (4.79) (12.2) (13.4) 
  Medium -5.77** -.629 -11.4* 
   (2.68) (3.35) (6.38) 
  Low -8.04*** -2.44 -18.4*** 
   (2.42) (3.35) (4.13) 
 Share of Males High -.007 .002 -.011 
   (.007) (.037) (.031) 
  Medium -.006 .020 -.004 
   (.006) (.016) (.014) 
  Low -.017*** .009 -.023** 
   (.006) (.016) (.010) 
      
Observations  869,057 96,936 47,528 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** 
p<.05; *** p<.01). All specifications include state fixed effect, cohort fixed effect, state 
specific time trend and control for abortion legalization. Additional controls include 
dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife, 




Table 1.9.a  The Impact of Early Access to Birth Control Pill on  
Men’s Planned Careers by Race and College Selectivity 
 
   Men by Race and College Selectivity 
   (1) (2) (3) 
  Coll. Select. White Black Other 
Outcome Variable     
 Average Income High 12.6 -66.4 707.2** 
   (150.4) (297.4) (330.7) 
  Medium 257.9* 866.4*** 251.6 
   (143.6) (237.0) (295.6) 
  Low 36.0 -161.0 115.1 
   (107.1) (158.0) (357.1) 
 Siegel Prestige 
Score 
High 4.46 3.31 6.64 
   (4.13) (6.45) (7.18) 
  Medium -5.56 3.68 1.93 
   (4.11) (6.29) (8.20) 
  Low -4.27 -4.99 -4.13 
   (3.62) (4.37) (7.16) 
 Share of Males High .004 -.002 .041*** 
   (.007) (.011) (.011) 
  Medium .026** .063*** -.000 
   (.012) (.019) (.013) 
  Low .018*** -.009 .030** 
   (.007) (.008) (.012) 
      
Observations  1,023,212 67,988 58,893 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** 
p<.05; *** p<.01). All specifications include state fixed effect, cohort fixed effect, state 
specific time trend and control for abortion legalization. Additional controls include 
dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife, 




Table 1.9.b  The Impact of Early Access to Birth Control Pill on  
Men’s Planned Careers by Race and High School Grades 
 
   Men by Race and High School Grades 
   (1) (2) (3) 
  High School 
Grades 
White Black Other 
Outcome Variable     
 Average Income High 71.01 304.9 158.9 
   (144.5) (233.8) (284.5) 
  Medium -16.8 -447.8** -264.3 
   (79.4) (180.5) (304.0) 
  Low 20.9 -219.6 -335.2 
   (82.1) (150.9) (262.3) 
 Siegel Prestige 
Score 
High -8.49 -3.79 -19.2*** 
   (5.35) (6.68) (6.81) 
  Medium -9.71*** -8.93* -11.2* 
   (3.01) (4.83) (6.34) 
  Low -7.31** -10.4** -9.98** 
   (2.96) (4.69) (4.55) 
 Share of Males High .005 -.001 -.000 
   (.005) (.011) (.016) 
  Medium .012** -.021*** -.006 
   (.005) (.006) (.015) 
  Low .019*** -.007 .003 
   (.006) (.009) (.017) 
      
Observations  1,023,212 67,988 58,893 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** 
p<.05; *** p<.01). All specifications include state fixed effect, cohort fixed effect, state 
specific time trend and control for abortion legalization. Additional controls include 
dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife, 




Table 1.10  The Impact of Early Access to Birth Control Pill on Views Regarding 
Married Women in the Labor Market – Do Students Agree with the Statement: “The 
Activities of Married Women are Best Confined to the Home and Family”? 
 
    Women by College Selectivity Men by College Selectivity 
    High Medium Low High Medium Low 
                
  Logit Coeff. -.209** -.025 -.005 -.129** -.027 .004 
    (.103) (.107) (.047) (.063) (.073) (.039) 
  Ordered Logit Coeff. -.055 -.013 - -.162** - .016 
    (.079) (.107)   (.064)   (.056) 
                
Specificaton             
  Additional Controls " " " " " " 
  Abortion Control " " " " " " 
  
State Specific Time 
Trend " " " " " " 
Observations 355,880 288,482 515,909 412,719 251,612 466,260 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). All 
specifications include state fixed effect, college cohort fixed effect, and controls for race. Additional 
controls include dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife, 
individual is catholic, as well as controls for college selectivity and individuals' high school grades. In the 
logit specification, the dependent variable takes value one if the individual strongly agrees or somewhat 
agrees to the statement. In the ordered logit, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual strongly 
disagrees, 2 if she somewhat disagrees, 3 if she somewhat agrees, and 4 if she strongly agrees. If no 





Table 1.11  The Impact of Early Access to the Birth Control Pill on College Attendance 
 
  Women 
  All White Black Other 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outcome Variable     
 At least one year of 
college 
-.041* -.043* -.014 -.033 
  (.024) (.026) (.019) (.061) 
 College Degree -.029 -.032 .006 -.043 
  (.026) (.026) (.036) (.061) 
      
Observations 2,084,163 1,796,453 230,361 57,349 
  Men 
  All White Black Other 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Outcome Variable     
 At least one year of 
college 
-.060 -.060 -.046 -.106* 
  (.040) (.043) (.036) (.053) 
 College Degree -.041 -.041 -.021 -.101** 
  (.031) (.032) (.038) (.045) 
      
Observations 2,012,408 1,769,962 186,991 55,455 
Notes: The data used here is from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses, and includes people born between 1942 
and 1958. The reported estimates are logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and 
clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). All specifications include state fixed effect, age fixed 
effect and census year fixed effect, and controls for race. All the regressions include control for abortion 




Table 1.12  Census Data: The Impact of Early Access  
to the Pill on Actual Career Outcomes 
 
  Women 
 Outcome Variable All White Black Other 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Occupational Characteristics     
 Average Income in 1970 40.6** 73.3*** -239.6*** 118.1 
  (19.4) (19.6) (42.1) (91.8) 
 Siegel Prestige Score -.003 .077 -.735*** .499 
  (.078) (.089) (.154) (.243) 
 Male Ratio in 1970 .003** .003** .002 .005 
  (.001) (.001) (.003) (.006) 
Real Outcomes     
 Employed .018 .018 -.003 .112 
  (.013) (.013) (.042) (.078) 
 Total Income (1999 USD) 135.3 400.6*** -2,146.5*** 798.1 
  (113.0) (125.5) (286.1) (492.1) 
      
Observations 1,047,334 931,072 92,576 23,665 
  Men 
  All White Black Other 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Outcome Variable     
 Average Income in 1970 59.9** 68.2** -56.9* 155.7 
  (28.3) (30.5) (31.3) (95.2) 
 Siegel Prestige Score .108 .160 -.582*** .446 
  (.107) (.113) (.188) (.311) 
 Male Ratio in 1970 .003** .003** .001 .005 
  (.001) (.001) (.002) (.004) 
Real Outcomes     
 Employed .004 .002 .036 -.106 
  (.023) (.031) (.060) (.102) 
 Total Income (1999 USD) 974.1*** 894.6*** 1,505.6*** 2,119.0*** 
  (265.6) (274.6) (418.6) (654.2) 
      
Observations 1,119,945 1,023,524 71,066 25,343 
Notes: The data used here is from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Censuses. It includes those born between 1942 and 
1958, with at least one year of college education. The reported estimates on "employed" are logit coefficients. 
Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). All 
specifications include state fixed effect, age fixed effect and census year fixed effect, and controls for race. All 











In the 1960s teaching was a prevalent occupational choice for college-educated men. In 1968 
11% of male college freshmen planned for a career in secondary teaching, making it the 
second most popular planned occupation after engineering.25 In contrast, by 1980 less than 
2% of male college freshmen planned to teach in secondary schools. Elementary teaching, 
though a much less common career path for males, also fell in popularity, from 1.1 percent in 
1968 to 0.5 percent in 1980. While there was also a decline in the popularity of teaching 
among women the share of males among those who planned to teach fell from 30.6 percent in 
1968 down to 19.7 percent in 1980 (CIRP Freshman Surveys).  
During this period there were major shifts in attitudes and social norms regarding sex, 
marriage and family formations, in part due to the legalization of abortion and the diffusion 
of the birth control pill. Although theoretical arguments suggest that changes in access to 
fertility controls may have affected men as well as women through changed market for 
marriage and sex (see e.g. Akerlof et al., 1996) they have largely been neglected in empirical 
analysis. In the first chapter of the dissertation I find that with unrestricted access to the birth 
control pill men did indeed shift their career aspirations as well as women, and that their 
career plans shifted towards occupations associated with higher income and higher male 
ratios.   
                                                
25 Source: author’s calculations using CIRP Freshmen Surveys, described further in Section 2. 
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Increased access to the pill has been found to have substantial effect on women’s family 
and labor market outcomes. Goldin and Katz (2002) present evidence that early access to the 
pill increased the age at first marriage and the share of women working in law and medicine. 
Moreover, Bailey (2006) finds that access to the pill delayed fertility, increased the number of 
women in the paid labor force, and raised the number of annual hours women worked. The 
impact on women suggests that there may have been a shift in the relative bargaining power 
of men and women in the marriage market, and in the intra-household framework. In an 
empirical paper Oreffice (2007) finds that abortion legalization increased the bargaining 
power of married women who were in their fertile years. Chiappori and Oreffice (2008) point 
out that as women’s bargaining power increased they were likely to require increased 
compensation e.g. for having children. Consequently, the shift in women’s bargaining power 
arising from increased access to fertility controls may have created incentives for men to shift 
their career plans towards occupations associated with higher income than before. As 
teaching stands out among the careers plans of male college freshmen (see Table 2.1) in 
terms of associated average income, increased access to fertility controls may have induced 
men who planned to become teachers to move to alternative occupations.  
Moreover, as the pill is likely to have delayed men’s family responsibilities as well as 
women’s, it may have given them more liberty to pursue their careers and human capital 
investments than before. Akerlof et al. (1996) note how the availability of contraceptives 
changed social norms regarding marriage and pregnancy. Until the early 1970s, it was 
customary for a couple to marry in the event of a pregnancy. When the availability of oral 
contraceptives and abortion legalization made having a child a physical choice of the mother, 
marriage and support became a social choice of the man. The effect of the pill on men could 




In this study I will focus on the effect of increased access to fertility controls on men’s 
career aspirations with a particular focus on the teaching occupation. Whereas several papers 
have studied the supply of women in teaching (e.g. Bacolod, 2007; Corcoran, Evans and 
Schwab, 2004; Dolton and Makepeace, 1993; Flyer and Rosen, 1997; Hoxby and Leigh, 2004 
and Shin and Moon, 2006) the focus of this paper is on men and why teaching became less 
popular among them. From a policy perspective, it is important to know how various policies 
attract different groups of people into teaching. One of the main goals among policy makers 
is to attract high ability people into teaching, but there is also a reason why policy may be 
concerned with the gender composition of teachers. Boys are increasingly less likely than 
girls to attend college and to receive a bachelor’s degree, and the dearth of male teachers may 
be a contributor to this trend. There is evidence suggesting that students perform better when 
taught by someone of their own gender (e.g. Dee, 2007), perhaps due to the teacher acting as 
a gender-specific role model, or the teacher’s gender affecting communication between the 
teacher and the student. Hence changes in the gender ratio among teachers may translate into 
altered patterns in the educational and labor market outcomes among men and women. 
This paper uses surveys of college freshmen from the late 1960s and 1970s to examine 
the effect of increased access to fertility controls on men’s teaching aspirations. I use state 
specific changes in abortion legalization and access to the birth control pill and control for 
teacher unionization as well as the state and cohort specific relative wages of teacher. In the 
analysis men are separated by their academic ability to see which men were most affected by 
these institutional changes. The findings show that increased access to the birth control pill 
had a significant negative effect on the probability that men planned to teach, in particular 
among those of medium and low academic ability. Examining other popular career choices 
among male college freshmen, it appears that men’s aspirations shift from teaching and 
scientific researching towards occupations that are associated with higher income, such as 
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accounting and other business occupations. Using Census Data, I find equivalent results when 
looking at actual career outcomes.  
Section 2.2 shortly discusses what determines the supply of teachers, Section 2.3 
considers the relationship between men’s career plans and changes in fertility and family 
formations, Section 2.4 discusses other factors that potentially influenced men’s teaching 
plans in the 1970’s, Section 2.5 describes the data and the main variables, Section 2.6 
outlines the empirical strategy and presents the results and Section 2.7 concludes.  
2.2 The Supply of Teachers 
When studying the teaching sector it is important to bear in mind some of its specific 
characteristics. First, the teaching occupation is heavily dominated by women and has been 
seen as an attractive choice for women who want to combine work and family 
responsibilities. Secondly, the teaching sector is controlled by the government, with the 
demand for teachers and wages set by government authorities. Pay schemes and the 
promotional ladder are fairly rigid, and there is little room for financial rewards for good 
performance. Thirdly, teaching is a heavily unionized sector. The unions further affect the 
wages structure of the profession, but also act an important role in shaping the job itself and 
its non-pecuniary characteristics. Non-pecuniary aspects of teaching such as security, 
flexibility, work conditions and prestige are likely to be of significant importance for its 
attractiveness and thus an important factor to take into consideration when studying the 
supply of teachers.  
While some suggest that higher income among teachers would attract more people into 
the occupation (see e.g. Manski, 1987; Dolton 1990) others find little or no effect of relative 
teacher earnings (see e.g. Hanushek and Pace, 1995). The literature on teachers’ supply 
focuses largely on women (e.g. Dolton and Makepeace, 1993; Flyer and Rosen, 1997; 
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Corcoran, Evans and Schwab, 2004) or looks at the pooled results for men and women. 
Separating the effect of an increase in teachers’ relative pay, Chevalier, Dolton and McIntosh 
(2007) find that while having a significant effect on both men’s and women’s decision to 
teach, men are more likely to react to a wage hike than women. The results of Dolton and 
Kidd (1995) suggest that difference in characteristics and labor market barriers between the 
genders explain the gap in their propensity to become teachers. If men made decisions “like” 
women, more of them would enter teaching, while women who acted “like” men would move 
from teaching to the private sector. As pointed out by Dolton (2006) “examination of the 
pattern of life cycle earnings for men in the USA and the UK in teaching and nonteaching 
alternative shows that if earnings were the only criteria used to decide a career then no men 
would become teachers in these countries.” It is thus important to consider other factors that 
may affect the decision to become a teacher.  
There are a few studies that address the issue of the relationship between teacher unions, 
teacher wages and teacher supply. Baugh and Stone (1982) find that teacher unionism 
produced relatively small wage gains in the early 1970s but that the gains increased 
substantially in the late 1970s. Hoxby (1996) finds that teachers’ unions increase teacher 
salaries and the teacher-student ratio but reduce productivity. On the other hand Lovenheim 
(2009) finds teachers’ unions to have no effect on teacher pay, per-student district 
expenditures or per-student revenues, but they increase teacher employment between 5 and 
10 percent. Looking at the ability composition of the teaching workforce, Hoxby and Leigh 




2.3 Access to Fertility Controls and Men’s Decision to Teach 
During the 1960s and 1970s the legalization of abortion and the diffusion of the birth 
control pill affected young men and women in many ways. While changes in women’s labor 
supply over this period have been studied extensively, little attention has been paid to shifts 
in men’s careers. In Chapter 1 I find that both men’s and women’s career plans were affected 
by unrestricted access to the birth control pill and that men’s overall aspirations shift towards 
more male dominated occupations. When separated by ability, the effect stems from those of 
medium and low ability.  
As can be seen in Table 2.1 teaching stands out among the career plans of male college 
freshmen in terms of average income, the share of males in the occupation and the 
occupational prestige score. It is thus of particular interest to examine how an innovation like 
the pill, which had sizable impact on both family responsibilities and the conditions in the 
marriage market affected men’s decision to choose a career in teaching. 
2.3.1 Female Empowerment 
 When discussing the effect of the pill on labor market outcomes and human capital 
investments, the main focus is typically on the increased control that women gain over their 
lives. As they were able to control and time their fertility more accurately, women’s human 
capital investments became more profitable and the pay-off less uncertain than before. Goldin 
and Katz (2002) present evidence that early access to the pill increased the share of women 
working in law and medicine and Bailey (2006) finds that early access to the pill delayed 
fertility, increased the number of women in the paid labor force, and raised the number of 
annual hours women worked.  
 Additionally, with the increased access to a reliable fertility control women gained power 
through their increased decision rights within the household (see e.g. Chiappori and Oreffice, 
2008 and Oreffice, 2007). Women’s increased bargaining power and higher human capital 
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investments, should mean higher transfers to women in the household, e.g. higher 
compensation for leaving the labor market due to childbearing. This could hence put a 
pressure on men shift their aspsirations to careers associated with higher income than before. 
 Furthermore, it may have been the case that if increased access to birth control enabled 
women to pursue more education and more competitive careers than before, wages became a 
more important factor for men, as they may have felt a psychological need to uphold their 
role as breadwinners in the household. This is related to an argument detailed in Edlund and 
Korn (2002) where marriage is thought of as a contract between men and women, in which 
men compensate women for reproductive sex and forgone market earnings. By enabling 
women to pursue their careers and human capital investments, the pill may have made wives 
more expensive, motivating men to obtain higher wages than before.  
2.3.2 Delayed Family Responsibilities 
 Another reason that men may have shifted their career aspirations with increased access 
to fertility controls, is simply through delayed marriage and fatherhood. Teaching may in 
particular have been an important outlet for college-educated men who because of family 
responsibilities, did not have the opportunity to choose careers that required intensive human 
capital investments and labor market attachment.  
The compatibility of teaching with family responsibilities is oftend mentioned in the 
context of female’s decision to teach – but it may also have been an important factor for the 
appeal of the teaching occupation to men. The teaching hours, the timing and quantity of 
holidays, and the possibility to work partly at home (e.g. preparing and grading) allow 
teachers to combine their parental responsibilities and work more easily than is possible in 
many other occupations. Furthermore, career interruptions are penalized to less extent in 
teaching than in most other occupations held by college graduates. Flyer and Rosen (1997) 
find that while on average the wages of female college graduates take wage hits of 
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approximately 9 percent for each year spent out of the labor force, teachers do not suffer any 
wage penalty when temporarily leaving the occupation. 
Akerlof et al. (1996) relate the decline in shotgun marriages and the increase in out-of-
welock births, to the legalization of abortion and the diffusion of the birth control pill. They 
note how the availability of contraceptives may have changed social norms regarding 
marriage and pregnancy. With decreased responsibility in premarital relationships men may 
have acquired more freedom to focus on their education and careers.  
2.4 Other Important Changes in the 1970s 
 Other changes during the 1970’s that may have played a role in the decreased popularity 
of teaching among men: 
2.4.1 Unions 
 From 1955 onward, various states passed laws that facilitated or forestalled teachers’ 
unionization. The presence of a union may change the characteristics of the teaching 
occupation along several dimensions. It may ensure more pleasant work environment for 
teachers, e.g. through lower student-teacher ratios, more job security and higher minimum 
salary, while unions’ collective bargaining may also result in increasingly compressed pay 
and benefits, and thereby less room to reward ability within the occupation. Arguing that 
unionization compressed wages in the teaching sector, Hoxby and Leigh (2004) find that 
unions played an important role in pushing high aptitude women away from teaching, 
between 1963 and 2000.  In the empirical analysis I include controls for changed union laws. 
2.4.2 Vietnam 
 Between 1940 and 1973, the U.S. Army relied on a sustained military draft. All 18 to 25 
year old men were judged by local boards, with the most common classifications being I-A 
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(ready for duty), II-S (student deferment), III-A (hardship deferment), and IV-F (unfit for 
servoce). Technically men were draft-elgiable until their 26th birthday, but the average age 
was between 19 and 20, and very few men were drafted after their 23rd birthday (Kuziemko, 
2007).  
Initially it appears to have been quite easy to get deferments and exemptions. For 
example, in 1964 one-third of 18 year old men were deemed unfit for service. Moreoever, 
being drafted seldomly led to combat duty. However as the Vietnam War surged, quotas 
increased and deferments became more difficult to obtain. After 1967, anyone enrolled as a 
full-time undergraduate student at a college or university was granted II-S status. Card and 
Lemieux (2001) find that draft avoidance raised college attendance rates by 4-6 percentage 
points in the late 1960s, introducing a potential selection problem when studying college 
students during this period. There is furthermore anectodal evidence that one could get an 
exemption by teaching high schools in underprivileged areas. While there was some state-
specific variation in draft avoidance, the risk known ex ante was year specific (see Malamud 
and Wozniak, 2008). This should hence be captured by the year fixed effects. For further 
robustness, I have repeated my main analysis using only survey years after the draft ended 
(not reported here). The results are consistent with the findings in the paper, although only 
significant for men of medium academic ability. Furthermore, the results in the Census 
Analysis are robust to including all men, not just men with college education, avoiding at 
least part of the potential selection problem.  
2.4.3 Title IX 
 In 1972 the Title IX of the Education Amendments was enacted. It states that “No person 
in the United States shall on basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
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receiving Federal financial assistance...” (United States Code Section 20).26 While some 
activities were exempt from Title IX, such as fraternities and sororities, and sex-specific 
youth clubs such as Girl and Boy Scouts, Title IX did apply to athletics, and its main effect 
may in fact have been on high-school and college sport activities. The law meant that if a 
particular sport was available within the school, there had to be teams for both girls and boys, 
or students of both sexes should be allowed to try out for the same team. Many have 
contended that this lead to the dismantling of some of men’s popular sport programs. 
Consequently, Title IX may have reduced the opportunities for high school teachers to coach 
boys, and in that way perhaps decreased the attractiveness of teaching for males. The 
empirical analysis includes year fixed effects as well as state specific time trends, which 
should capture the effect of Title IX on men’s decision to become teachers. 
2.5 Data 
The primary source of data in the analysis is the Cooperative Institutional Research 
Program’s (CIRP) Freshman Surveys, which have been conducted annually by the UCLA 
Higher Education Research Institute since 1966. Each year, the survey is administered to all 
incoming freshmen at more than 700 colleges and universities. Nearly 90 percent of the 
institutions in the CIRP Freshman Surveys are repeat participants, and, to ensure consistency 
and minimize response bias, each cohort is stratified and weighted to be a nationally 
representative sample of first-time, full-time students entering institutions of higher education 
in each year.27 The analysis includes surveys from 1968, 1969, and 1972 through 1980. The 
                                                
26 See e.g. http://law.cornell.edu/uscode/20/1681.html 
27 The defined population consists of all “eligible” institutions of higher education listed by the U.S. Office of 
Education in its annual Education Directory. An institution is considered “eligible” if it is functioning at the 
time of the survey and has the equivalent of a first-time entering freshman class of at least 30 students. The data 
is stratified into 37 cells based on institution’s characteristics. The data is weighted by these stratification cells 
to account for diproportionate sampling. Moreover the weights adjust for less than 100% participation of 




1966 and 1970 surveys were not accessible. The 1967 survey is excluded from the empirical 
analysis as it does not include a measure for college selectivity and the 1971 survey is 
omitted as information on the state of the institution is missing. The analysis is restricted to 
students who were between 17 and 19 years old at the end of their first year of college.28 
Notably, these surveys were quite large; they contain around 270,000 students per survey 
year on average and, pooled across years, almost 3.5 million students in total.  
To compare the changes in career plans to actual changes in labor market outcomes, I 
use the 5% Public Use Microdata Samples of the 1980 and 1990 Censuses. In the Census 
analysis I include the 1942-1958 birth cohorts. The Census Data does not have information 
on the state of college attended or the state of residence during the diffusion of the birth 
control pill, so it is therefore assumed that people attended college or resided in their reported 
states of residence. The Census person weights are used to obtain nationally representative 
statistics and results.  
2.5.1 Career Plans 
 Table 2.1 shows the the occupational characteristics for the top ten career plans, as well 
as elementary teaching, among male college freshmen in 1968 and 1980. It shows the average 
income among college educated men within a particular occupation, drawn from the 1970 
Census. It also shows the share of males for each occupation in 1970, and the Siegel prestige 
score, which is based on series of surveys conducted at the National Opinion Research 
Center, where respondents were asked to evaluate either “general standing” or “social 
standing” of occupations. The surveys were conducted from 1963 to 1965 and are therefore 
likely to capture young people’s sentiment towards various occupations right before the 
period studied here.  
                                                
28 89% of the students in the sample are between 17 and 19 years old. 
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As can be seen in the table, the popularity of teaching among males dropped 
considerably during this period. Furthermore, one can see that teaching stands out among the 
occupations in terms of income, prestige and the share of males – all of these being 
particularly low. There is little change in the popularity of the occupations with the highest 
income and prestige scores, such as doctors and lawyers. On the other hand, occupations such 
as engineering, accounting and computer programming become increasingly favored as 
men’s planned careers over the period. 
2.5.2 Who Plans to Teach? 
 Figure 2.1.a shows how the share of males among 25-35 year old teachers in the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) decreased steadily from 1970 and until the early 1980s. In 1970 the 
share of males was 38.5%, dropping down to 25.3% in 1985. Figure 2.1.b shows the share of 
males among each birth cohort of teachers.29 While it appears somewhat noisy, the downward 
trend is evident among the cohorts affected by the diffusion of the birth control pill, i.e. the 
cohorts born between 1942 (18 year olds in 1960 when access to the birth control pill among 
unmarried 18-21 year olds became unrestricted in the first two states; Alska and Arkansas) 
and 1958 (18 year olds in 1976 when restrictions in the last state, Missouri, were removed).  
Figure 2.2 graphs the share of males among those who plan to teach, and the share of 
male college freshmen who plan to teach, in the CIRP Freshman Surveys.30 As was also clear 
from Table 2.1, the percentage of college freshmen who plan to teach falls constantly over 
the period, and while the trend in the gender ratio among teachers apsirants is less stable, the 
share of males falls from 27.3% in 1967 to 19.1 % in 1980.  
                                                
29 The calculations in Figure 1b use data from the 1962-1999 surveys, restricting the sample to 25-55 year olds, 
who are in the labor market at the time of the survey. 
30 The dotted line between 1969 and 1971 indicates the missing value for 1970. 
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Table 2.2.a compares the characteristics of male students who plan to teach to those who 
plan on other careers. Men who aspire to become teachers are disproportionally drawn from 
the lower end of the academic ability distribution. They are less likely to come from a high 
income household and less likely to have college educated parents than other male college 
freshmen. 
Table 2.2.b considers the characteristics of men who plan to teach in 1968 and in 1980. 
While there are considerably fewer observations in 1980 (2,248 observations compared to 
12,580 observations in 1968) the average level of academic aptitude among them appears to 
be higher. The teacher aspirants in 1980 are also more likely to have college educated 
parents, which is likely to be mostly explained by increased level of education over time.   
2.5.3 Academic Ability 
 There are two measures of academic achievement available in the CIRP surveys: high 
school grade point average, and college selectivity. The college selectivity measure is a 
categorical variable based on the median SAT composite scores of the entering class, and 
takes one of six values: very high, high, medium, low selectivity and no selectivity.31 High 
school grades are self-reported and take values from 1 (D or lower) to 8 (A/A+). Both 
aptitude measures are imperfect and each gives a somewhat different picture of students’ 
abilities: the correlation between high school grades and college selectivity is only .234. 
However, both measures are likely to provide partial indication of students’ academic 
ability.32  
                                                
31 The approximate range of mean SAT scores of students entering institutions with low selectivity is 999 or 
less, 1,000 – 1,149 for medium selectivity, 1,150 – 1,249 for high, and 1,250 or higher for institutions that are 
very highly selective. 
32 In addition, there is the possibility that these measures could be endogenous, as e.g. unrestricted access to 
birth controls may encourage people to work hard in high school and apply to more selective institutions. 
However, empirical results, not reported here, indicate that access to the explanatory variables of interest did not 
have a significant effect on the overall distribution of grades or college selectivity in the sample. 
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I use these two variables in the Survey Data to divide students into high, medium, and 
low ability groups. To be in the high ability group a student from a highly selective institution 
needs to have a GPA of B or higher, a student from a medium selective institution, needs a 
B+ or higher, and a student from an institution with low or no selectivity needs to have a 
GPA of A- or higher. To be in the medium ability group, a student from a highly selective 
institution needs to hava a GPA between C and B-, a student from a medium selective 
institution from C+ to B, and a student from an institution with low or no selectivity need to 
have a GPA of B or B+. Students with lower GPAs are placed in the low ability category. 
Using the sample weights discussed above, this categorization gives an ability distribution 
where 26.8% are in the high ability group, 39.2% in the medium ablity group and 34.0% in 
the low ability group.  
2.5.4 Access to the Birth Control Pill and Abortion Legalization 
 Although the birth control pill was approved by the FDA in 1960, there were considerable 
restrictions on access to it. In particular it was limitied by the age of majority, which was 21 
in most states, as unmarried minors could not obtain medical care and prescriptions without 
parental consent. During the 1960s and 1970s the age of majority was lowered from 21 to 18 
or 19 in most states mainly in order to fix legal inconsistencies, following the 26th 
Amendment to the Constitution, but sometimes due to mature minor doctrines that allowed 
legal infants to consent to medical care as long as they were mature enough to understand 
“the nature and the consequences of the treatment”, or comprehensive family statutes that 
allowed or did not explicitly restrict physicians from treating legal minors.33 Bailey (2006) 
provides dates for when unrestricted access to the birth control pill was availiable in each 
state, and the analysis here follows her classification.  
                                                
33 The Twenty – Sixth Amendment limited the minimum voting age to no more than 18. It was adopted on July 
1st, 1971, as a response to student activism against the Vietnam War and the fact that 18 year olds could be 
drafted to the military, without having the rights to vote.  
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Following earlier work (e.g. Angrist and Evans, 1999) abortion is considered to be 
available in 1971 in Alaska, Hawaii, New York and Washington and California. In the rest of 
the states abortion is considered to become available in 1974, following the Roe v. Wade 
decision. Assuming that the Roe v. Wade decision becomes effective in 1973 does not change 
the results from the analysis. As the variation in this variable is quite limited, it mainly serves 
as a control in the empirical analysis. 
2.5.5 Unions 
 Access to unions may be of particular importance when it becomes to the non-pecuniary 
benefits of the teaching occupation. From 1955 onward, various states passed laws that 
facilitated or forestalled teachers’ unionization. This paper uses passage of a law extending 
the right to meet or to engage in collective bargaining as an instrument for unionization, as 
well as laws allowing teachers’ unions to have agency shops and union shops (see Hoxby, 
1996 and Hoxby and Leigh, 2004). The empirical analysis includes a union variable 
containing these three types of law passages:  
 
 Union Rights: After 1960 there was a legal transition in the environment for public sector 
unions. Between 1960 and 1990 most states extended collective bargaining rights to teachers’ 
unions. For some states the right was limited to the right to organize for purposes of 
collective bargaining while other states teachers’ unions obtained the right to meet with 
administration representatives.34  
 
 Union Agency and Union Shop: Additionally, some states passed laws allowing teachers’ 
unions to have agency shops and union shops. Union is said to have an agency shop if it 
                                                
34 For detailed discussion see Hoxby (1996) 
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collects dues from all teachers in the bargaining unit, regardless of whether they are union 
members. A union shop exists if the school district cannot employ teachers who do not 
become union members (see Hoxby, 1996, p683). 
2.5.6 Relative Wages 
 I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) to calculate teacher wages relative to other 
male college educated workers. I restrict the sample to workers aged 25 to 55, to eliminate 
problems associated with joint school and work activities and retirement. As the relative 
wages are calculated by year and state, some of the cells include too few observations to 
calculate meaningful statistics. Hence when including the control for relative wages, the 
sample that can be used in the analyzis becomes considerably smaller. I therefore show the 
results results for specifications both including and excluding the relative wages of teachers.  
2.5.7 Census Data: Family Outcomes 
 To give some indication of whether access to the pill delayed men’s family 
responsibilities I look at the effect on two family outcomes in the Census: the age of first 
marriage, and age when oldest child in the household was born. As men are not asked about 
their age when they had their first child, the age of the oldest child is used as a proxy. It is 
however likely to be a very noisy measure, as the oldest child may not be the father’s and 
furthermore he may have an older child that does not live in the household.  
2.6 Empirical Strategy and Results 






where  takes value 1 if an individual i from state s and cohort c plans to teach, and zero 
otherwise. !s and !c are state and cohort fixed effects, respectively.  is an indicator 
variable for whether an individual in state s and cohort c had unrestricted access to the pill 
when starting college.  takes value 1 if an individual is in state and cohort such 
that abortion is legalized, and  takes value 1 if a student is in a cohort and state 
where teachers’ unionization has been facilitated through one of the law passages discussed 
in Section 2.5.5 The variable Xisc includes controls for individual characteristics such as race, 
religion, students’ high school grades and their college selectivity. To address concerns that 
the parameter of interest is mainly capturing other gradually evolving, unobserved state 
characteristics, I add state specific time trends. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust 
and are clustered by state to reflect the nature of the variation in the explanatory variables.  
2.6.1 Planned Careers 
 The reported estimates are the odds ratios, i.e. the estimated proportional change in the 
probability choosing teaching as a planned career, when the explanatory variable changes 
from zero to one. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.3 report baseline estimates, pooling all men. 
The union variable and the relative wages of teachers do not have a significant effect on the 
probability that men choose teaching as their planned career. The effect of abortion 
legalization appears to positive, but not signficant in the first specification and only 
marginally significant when relative wages of teachers are included. As discussed in Section 
2.5.4 there is limited variation in the abortion variable, which is decreased even further by 
including teachers’ relative wages as some of the year-cohort cells drop out of the sample. 
While it may be surprising that the effect of abortion legalization is in the opposite direct of 
the pill, having a seeimingly positive effect on the probablity that men choose teaching as 
their career, it may be that the variable is mainly capturing a year fixed effect for 1974. 
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Increased access to the birth control pill significantly decreases the probability that a 
male college freshman chooses teaching as his planned career.35 The estimated odds ratio, i.e. 
the relative probability of choosing teaching when one has access to the birth control pill, to 
the probability of choosing teaching when access to the birth control pill is restricted, is .760, 
which means it explains about one third of the drop in the fraction of men who plan to teach. 
In columns 3 to 8 of Table 2.3, estimates are reported separately for males in different ability 
groups (based on high school GPA and college selectivity), showing that the effect of 
increased access to the birth control pill is concentrated on men from the medium and low 
ability groups.  
If men from the low and medium ability groups shifted away from teaching when access 
to the birth control pill became unrestricted, then where do they go? In the first chapter I 
consider the effect of the birth control pill on the general career plans of young men and 
women, where I find that men in the medium and low ability groups who were in states and 
cohorts such that access to the pill was unrestricted, move to career aspirations associated 
with higher average income and higher share of males, but lower prestige scores. To provide 
further detail on these changes in career plans, I estimte here the effect of unrestricted access 
to the birth control pill on the likelihood of men choosing particular careers among the most 
popular career options listed in Table 2.1. The results are presented in Table 2.4, where the 
occupations are ordered by their average income in 1970, with physicians having the highest 
average income, and computer programmers the lowest among these occupations. Increased 
access to the birth control pill does not appear to have an effect on men choosing the top tier 
occupations associated with the highest income, i.e. physician, lawyer, architect, business 
executive, or engineer. On the other hand men seem to shift their plans towards careers 
                                                
35 Separating the analysis for elementary and secondary teaching yields similar results and in particular a 
strongly significant, negative effect of birth control access in both cases. Repeating the analysis for women, I 
find no significant effect on their plans to become teachers.  
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ranked just above teaching in terms of average income. Men from the low ability group move 
towards computer programming which is the lowest ranked occupation after teaching. Men of 
medium academic ability move from plans to become teachers or scientific researchers 
towards becoming accountants or business owners. As was seen in Table 2.3, unrestricted 
access to the birth control pill did not have a significant effect on the teaching plans among 
men in the high ability group. However, in column 2 of Table 2.4, one can see that there is a 
decreased probability of men in this group choosing scientific researcher as their planned 
occupation, and increased probability that they choose accounting. Overall, there is a pattern 
observed in all ability groups, of men shifting their career plans from the occupations with the 
lowest income, with a notably strong effect on their plans to become teachers, towards 
occupations associated with higher income.   
2.6.2 Men’s Actual Career and Family Outcomes 
 As discussed in Section 2.3.2, one mechanism through which the pill may have affected 
men’s career plans was through delayed family responsibilities. I use data from the Census to 
see whether increased access to the birth control pill had an effect on men’s age of first 
marriage and the age when his first child is born. The results in Table 2.5 show little effect on 
the timing of men’s family responsibilites, although there is a marginally signficant negative 
effect on the probability that a man is married when he is 20 years old. Hence there is not 
much evidence of delayed family responsibilities among men. However as noted in Section 
2.5.7, these measures, in particular age when first child is born, are likely to be subject to 
substantial measurement errors. 
Looking at men’s actual career outcomes (Table 2.6) I find that having early access to the 
birth control pill signficantly decreased the likelihood that men became teachers, but 
increased the probability that they became business executives and accountants, which 
supports the results from the Freshman Surveys.  
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2.7 Concluding Remarks 
The popularity of teaching has decreased considerably in the last decades. Men have left 
the profession disproportionatly making teaching a heavily female dominated occupation. As 
evidence emerges that students are more responsive to teachers of their own race and gender, 
it should be the aim of policy makers to not only attract high ability people into teaching, but 
to attract good people from all demography groups. As male high school students are being 
outperformed by their female peers in the classroom, and the female favoring gender gap in 
college enrollment and college completion rates is widening, it may become increasingly 
important to attract able men into the teaching sector.  
The results presented in the paper imply that when analyzing changes and policies that 
affect fertility and other family factors, the impact on men should not be ignored. It is likely 
that they experience both direct and indirect effects from such changes, e.g. through shifts in 
bargaining power in the marriage market and in the intra-household framework. I find that 
with increased access to a reliable birth control men in particular moved away from teaching 
and into better paid occupations.  
Although the empirical literature on the effect of fertility controls has largely focused on 
women, the theoretical arguments suggest that men may have been affected through delayed 
fertility and changes in the market for sex and marriage, as well as women. It may however 
seem surpricing that the main effect appears to be on men rather than women. While having a 
child surely affects men’s ability to invest in their human capital, one would think that the 
chief effect is on the mothers. 
As discussed in Section 2.3, one possible reason for the seemingly greater impact on men 
is that some women may have become worse off with the introduction of the birth control 
pill. In particular, those who failed to adopt the new technology, e.g. because of moral or 
religious reasons, and may consuequently have become more likely to deal with a premarital 
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pregnancy on their own (see e.g. Akerlof et al. 1996). Another potential reason is that there 
may have been a bigger effect on women on the extensive margin, i.e. on their decision to go 
to college. If access to the birth control pill increased the probability that women enrolled in 
college, and thereby entered the sample of college students, that may bias the results. 
However it does not appear that access to the birth control pill is associated with changes in 
the observed characteristics of the college sample (see Tables A.4 and A.5). A third 
possibility is that while the birth control pill enabled women to pursue more education and 
better careers, the income effect due to the shift in bargaining power, meant that they had less 
incentive to invest in their human capital. For men on the other hand, both of these 
mechanisms work in the same direction, i.e. shifting men’s career aspirations towards jobs 
associated with higher salary. 
In contrast to the strongly significant effect of unrestricted access to the birth control pill, 
unionization and the relative wages of teachers have negligible effect on the teaching plans of 
college freshmen – perhaps signaling the particularity of the allure of the teaching 
occupation. It has been emphasized that teaching is an attractive alternative for women who 
want to combine work with family responsibilities, as teaching provides both more flexibility 
and security than most other careers. The findings here suggest that this may also have been 
an important factor in men’s decision to teach. When family responsibilities became less 
restrictive, at the same time as the pressure to earn higher income may have gone up, the 
value of these properties is likely to have diminished. It is thus likely that with other policies 
seeking to make it easier on people to combine work and family, e.g. with increased parental 


















Figure 2.1.b  % Males Among those who Teach in each  










Figure 2.2. Male Teacher Aspirants Among College  









Table 2.1.  Summary Statistics: Men’s Career Plans and Occupational Characteristics 
 
Planned Career Rank in 
1968 
% in 1968 Rank in 
1980 
% in 1980 Average income 
in 1970 
Share of males in 
1970 (%) 
Prestige 
Engineer 1 15.0 1 18.0 15,174.0 98.6 64.4 
Secondary Teacher 2 11.3 10 1.9 8,149.4 51.5 59.6 
Business Executive 3 10.0 2 11.7 16,646.70 87.2 50.3 
Lawyer 4 5.8 5 4.8 21,771.4 95.9 75.7 
Physician 5 4.1 6 4.6 26,870.6 92.0 81.5 
Scientific Researcher 6 4.0 9 2.4 11,437.6 73.1 78.3 
Accountant 7 3.6 3 6.0 12,982.4 92.0 56.7 
Architect 8 2.5 8 2.5 16,862.3 96.9 70.5 
Computer Programmer 9 2.3 4 5.8 9,555.2 75.5 - 
Business Owner/ 
Proprietor 
10 2.0 7 4.0 13,216.50 86.0 37.6 
Elementary Teacher 18 1.1 24 0.5 6,933.4 16.6 59.6 
Notes: The average income and the share of males are calculated from the 1970 Census, using college graduates who are currently 
employed. The prestige scores are assigned to the 1950 occupational codes in the Census, where there is only one group for non-
college teaching; elementary and secondary teaching therefore have the same score. There is no prestige score for computer 










Table 2.2.a   Summary Statistics – Men who Plan to  
Teach vs. Men who Plan for Other Careers 
 
  (i) (ii) (iii) 
  Teach Other career plans Difference (ii)-(i) 
# obs. 73,501 1,629,482  
Academic Ability    
 High .267 .427 .160*** 
  (.002) (.000) (.002) 
 Medium .408 .342 -.066*** 
  (.002) (.000) (.002) 
 Low .325 .231 -.094*** 
  (.002) (.000) (.002) 
Race (%)    
 White .884 .878 -.006*** 
  (.001) (.000) (001) 
 Black .071 .066 -.006*** 
  (.001) (.000) (.001) 
 Other .045 .057 .012*** 
  (.001) (.000) (.001) 
Catholic .273 .225 -.048*** 
  (.002) (.000) (.002) 
High Income .070 .170 .100*** 
  (.001) (.000) (.001) 
Father has college educ. .238 .392 .153*** 
  (.002) (.000) (.002) 
Mother has a college educ. .134 .197 .063*** 
  (.001) (.000) (.000) 
Notes: Column (i) presents means for those who plan to teach and column (ii) for thos who o 
plan on non-teaching careers. Column (iii) presents the difference between those who plan to 
teach and others. Standard errors are in the parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 
percent level, ** at 5 percent and *** at 1 percent. The p-values correspond to the two-tailed 













Table 2.2.b  Summary Statistics – Male Teacher Aspirants in 1968 and 1980 
 
  (i) (ii) (iii) 
  Teach in 1968 Teach in 1980 Difference (i)-(ii) 
# obs. 12,580 2,248  
Academic Ability    
 High .271 .345 -.074*** 
  (.004) (.010) (.011) 
 Medium .417 .413 .004 
  (.004) (.010) (.011) 
 Low .312 .242 .070*** 
  (.004) (.009) (.010) 
Race (%)    
 White .871 .886 -.014 
  (.003) (.007) (.007) 
 Black .053 .081 -.028*** 
  (.002) (.006) (.006) 
 Other .076 .033 .042*** 
  (.002) (.004) (.004) 
Catholic .320 .287 .033*** 
  (.004) (.010) (.010) 
High Income .069 .056 .013** 
  (.002) (.005) (.005) 
Father has college educ. .192 .317 -.125*** 
  (.004) (.010) (.010) 
Mother has a college educ. .118 .161 -.044*** 
  (.003) (.008) (.008) 
Notes: Column (i) presents means for those who plan to teach and column (ii) for those who 
o plan on non-teaching careers. Column (iii) presents the difference between those who plan 
to teach and others. Standard errors are in the parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 
percent level, ** at 5 percent and *** at 1 percent. The p-values correspond to the two-tailed 













Table 2.3.   The Effect on Men’s Decision to Teach 
 
  Dependent Variable: Teach = 1 
  All High Ability Medium Ability Low Ability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent Variable         
 Pill .760*** .580*** .924 .863* .775** .511*** .769** .636*** 
  (.088) (0.68) (.132) (.072) (.094) (.068) (.086) (.096) 
 Abortion 1.127 1.217* 1.132* 1.073 1.159 1.398*** .969 1.037 
  (.131) (.142) (.082) (.086) (.126) (.155) (.091) (.153) 
 Union .098 .983 .923 .679*** .933 1.003 1.086 1.167 
  (.074) (.076) (.118) (.057) (.078) (.123) (.064) (.128) 
 Log Relative Wages - .966 - 1.141 - .673* - 1.188 
   (.112)  (.251)  (.161)  (0.186) 
          
State Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Cohort Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
State Specific Time Trend ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
          
Observations 1,587,037 980,721 668,143 440,766 545,602 325,134 373,292 214,418 
Notes: The reported estimates are the odds ratios. Standard errors are robust and clustered by state (*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<01). All specifications 





Table 2.4.   The Effect of Unrestricted Access to the Pill on Men’s Career Plans 
 
  All High Ability Medium 
Ability 
Low Ability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Dependent Variable    
 Physician = 1 .933 .953 .910 1.143 
  (.092) (.085) (.096) (.147) 
 Lawyer = 1 1.040 1.029 1.063 1.092 
  (.071) (.083) (.095) (.095) 
 Architect = 1 .949 .931 .995 .896 
  (.112) (.119) (.171) (.148) 
 Business Exec. = 1 .955 1.147 .955 .940 
  (.058) (.110) (.050) (.070) 
 Engineer = 1 .963 .844 1.023 .902 
  (.133) (.127) (.170) (.123) 
 Business Owner, 
Proprietor = 1 
1.252*** 1.264 1.527*** 1.127 
  (.072) (.439) (.145) (.105) 
 Accountant = 1 1.134* 1.202** 1.169** 1.058 
  (0.084) (.106) (.078) (.116) 
 Scientific 
Researcher = 1 
.831*** .820* .830*** 1.031 
  (.063) (.088) (.053) (.113) 
 Computer 
Programmer = 1 
1.276*** 1.108 1.118 1.377*** 
  (.095) (.128) (.118) (.119) 
      
Observations 1,587,037 668,142 545,602 373,292 
Notes: The reported estimates are the odds ratios. Standard errors are robust and clustered by state 
(*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<01). All specifications include controls for high school grades, college 










Table 2.5.   The Effect of Unrestricted Access  
to the Pill on Men’s Family Outcomes 
 
  OLS coeff. Odds Ratio 
    
Dependent Variable   
 Age when first married -.003 - 
  (.032)  
 Age when first child -.206 - 
  (.304)  
 Married before 20 = 1 - .947* 
   (.031) 
 Married before 21 = 1 - .986 
   (.026) 
 Married before 22 = 1 - 1.025 
   (.021) 
 First child before 20 = 1 - .988 
   (.012) 
 First child before 21 = 1 - .996 
   (.012) 
 First child before 22 = 1 - 1.009 
   (.011) 
    
Observations 483,095 483,095 
Notes: The data used here is from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses. It includes those born between 
1942 and 1958, with at least one year of college education. Standard errors in parentheses are 
robust and clustered by state (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). All specifications include state fixed 
effect, age fixed effect and census year fixed effect, and controls for race. All the regressions 
include control for abortion legalization and a state specific - cohort trend.  
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Table 2.6.   The Effect of Unrestricted Access  
to the Pill on Men’s Actual Careers 
 
  (1) (2) 
    
Dependent Variable   
 Physician = 1 1.041 .970 
  (.044) (.078) 
 Lawyer = 1 .983 1.003 
  (.026) (.040) 
 Architect = 1 .998 .941 
  (.054) (.110) 
 Business Exec. = 1 1.035** 1.064** 
  (.015) (.030) 
 Engineer = 1 1.077* 1.012 
  (.046) (.042) 
 Business Owner, Proprietor = 1 1.005 .988 
  (.013) (.020) 
 Accountant = 1 1.080*** 1.062 
  (.027) (.044) 
 Scientific Researcher = 1 .958 .856** 
  (.045) (.055) 
 Computer Programmer = 1 1.032 1.042 
  (.074) (.097) 
 Teach = 1 .927** .912** 
  (.033) (.033) 
    
 Addiational Controls No Yes 
    
Observations 1,534,110 583,707 
Notes: The data used here is from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses. It includes those born 
between 1942 and 1958, with at least one year of college education . The reported estimates 
are the odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state (* p<.10; 
** p<.05; *** p<.01). All specifications include state fixed effect, age fixed effect and census 
year fixed effect, and controls for race. All the regressions include control for abortion 
legalization and a state specific - cohort trend. Additional controls include controls for union 
strengths, and relative wages of teachers, when the individual was 18 years old. 










The Signaling Value of Education and Gender 





Since the early ‘80s women have outnumbered men among new college 
graduates. As women are likely to spend more time out of the labor force than men, 
and earn less given their education, it may seem puzzling why they tend to invest 
more in their human capital. The reversed gender gap in college attendance 
introduces a previously unknown imbalance between the genders, as it favors women 
rather than men and college admission officers now face the question of whether they 
should consider implementing affirmative action for males, to ensure campus 
diversity (see Greene and Greene, 2004). If women continue to outpace men in 
college completion, gender gaps in wages, labor force participation and other labor 
market outcomes will undoubtedly be affected. This could furthermore have a 
considerable effect on marriage markets, household bargaining and family 
formations.  
The question addressed in the literature on the gender differences in schooling is 
twofold: first why there has been such a large increase in the ratio of women who 
attend college, and secondly why they not only caught up but surpassed men in their 
college completion rates. A third question may be introduced as to why this 
phenomenon seems to be particular to racial minorities, and people from low-income 
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families. In the existing research on the gender gap, surprisingly little notice has been 
given to the stark differences in various demography groups. According to a recent 
study the gender gap in college enrollment rates is widest among blacks (where 60% 
are women), and among students from low-income families (58% women). Among 
Hispanics 55% of enrolled students are women, and 54% among whites. 53 %of 
college students from middle-income families, and 52% of students from high income 
families are female.36  
Various factors have been brought up in the aim to explain the female advantage 
in college enrollment rates including differences in cognitive and non-cognitive 
abilities, higher marginal returns to education among women, gender specific school 
effects, and social/psychological factors. In this paper a game-theoretic signaling 
model introduced by Lang and Manove (2011) is applied to study how gender 
discrimination may create incentives for women to signal their productivity through 
education. I examine the possibility that education may be particularly valuable to 
women, as a tool to signal (or reveal) ability and labor market attachment. If women 
are discriminated against in the labor market and the discrimination is more prevalent 
in the labor market for less educated, then completing college education may be 
particularly valuable to them.  
Using data from NLSY79, I compare educational decisions given ability (as 
measured by the Armed Forces Qualification Test scores), and the returns to ability 
and schooling. The predictions of the signaling model are estimated separately for 
whites, blacks and Hispanics, as to get a better understanding where the differences 
                                                
36 See King (2006) 
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across demography groups come from. To address the gender and racial differences 
in labor market participation I impute wages for those who are not employed, based 
on characteristics, such as education, aid receipt and spousal income.  
The findings for white women support the hypothesis that signaling creates an 
increased value of education, in particular for those of medium ability. Women attain 
more schooling, given their AFQT scores, especially at the intermediate values. 
Among whites there is a corresponding increase in the gender wage gap (using hourly 
pay rate) given people’s education. In contrast to education there does not appear to 
be a significant difference in the way AFQT scores affect wages for men and women 
among whites. However, when using imputed wages to correct for selection in the 
labor market I find a significant and positive coefficient on the interaction term 
between females and AFQT scores among whites, which further supports the 
signaling story. 
There are several reasons why women may be at some disadvantage in the labor 
market, in particular when ability is less observable. As is argued in Lang and 
Manove (2011) and Arcidiacono et al. (2010) ability is likely to be less observable at 
lower levels of education, when one cannot for example use college grades and 
college selectivity to reveal information. Under such conditions networks, personal 
contacts and referrals can be of particular importance and groups that are 
inadequately represented in higher level positions may be at an information 
disadvantage as social networks are likely to run along gender lines as well as racial 
lines (see Altonji and Blank, 1999, Hellerstein, McInterney and Neumark, 2008 and 
Montgomery, 1991). In the psychology and management literature there is evidence 
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on how male managers are worse at evaluating females’ productivity than males’ 
productivity (e.g. Hamner et al., 1974; Surmann, 1997; Bauer and Baltes, 2002). 
Moreover several studies have documented more egalitarian gender role-attitudes 
among individuals with higher levels of education (Cherlin and Walters, 1981, 
Thornton et al., 1983, Thornton and Freedman, 1979), and thus one may expect to 
find employers with more egalitarian views in the labor market for educated workers.  
Another reason for why there may be a difference in the way ability of men and 
women is rewarded at lower levels of education is that women’s labor market 
attachment is less certain than men’s as a relatively large fraction of females are out 
of the labor force for considerable periods of time. As human capital investments are 
costly, higher educational levels can signal more labor market attachment. 
Section 3.2 discusses the gender gap in college completion rates, and the existing 
literature on the topic, Section 3.3 talks about how the signaling effect of education 
may generate increased incentive for women to obtain education, Section 3.4 gives an 
overview of the data, Section 3.5 presents the empirical analysis and results, and 
Section 3.6 concludes.  
3.2 The Gender Gap in College Completion Rates 
Female advantage in college enrollment and college completion rates is by now a 
worldwide phenomenon, even among countries with relatively low levels of GDP. In 
the US 57% of those enrolled in higher education in 2003 were females. Among 
undergraduates men made up 45 % of students 24 years and younger, and only 38 % 
of those 25 or older, making women a sizable majority group (King, 2006). There are 
without a doubt complex and multidimensional factors contributing to the explanation 
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of women’s overtake in higher education. Numerous studies show that cognitive as 
well as non-cognitive skills strongly predict schooling attainment and wages (see e.g. 
Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006). Both cognitive and non-cognitive skills lower 
the nonmonetary costs of schooling by making the accumulation of human capital 
easier. A common explanation for the gender gap in college completion rates is that 
girls tend to outperform boys in high school and engage in behavior, which increases 
the likelihood of enrolling in college (see e.g. Jacob, 2002 and Buchman and Diprete, 
2006). Becker, Hubbard and Murphy (2010) also focus on gender differences in the 
distribution of non-cognitive skills. However, rather than focusing on the mean they 
focus on the standard deviation which is by most measures significantly higher for 
men – indicating that there are more men than women at the upper tail of the 
distribution. As the demand for college graduates has grown the college earnings 
premium has increased as well. This has shifted the cutoff point in the skill 
distribution to the left, attracting relatively more women than men to college.  
Another segment in the literature has focused on the role of marginal returns to 
education and whether greater economic benefits of college for women can explain 
the female college advantage (see e.g. discussion in Goldin et al., 2006). Possible 
reasons for a higher college premium for women than men, can be that women are 
able to use education to escape gender discrimination in the labor market, or that 
uneducated men have more options, and access to better paid jobs, than uneducated 
women. A theoretical paper by Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009) explains the 
gender differences in schooling with a model where labor-market returns to schooling 
are higher for women. Several papers have found the college premium to be larger 
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among women than men (e.g. Murphy and Welch; 1989 and 1992; Card and 
DiNardo, 2002; Daugherty, 2005) and Jacob (2002) finds that the college premium 
accounts for approximately 40% of the gender gap in college completion. While 
DiPrete and Buchman (2006) find marginal returns to college to be higher for women 
than men their results indicate that this does not suffice to explain the observed 
gender gap. However, they find that it can be explained by a broader measure of well-
being, including marriage outcomes, household standard of living, and insurance 
against income deprivation.  
Recent papers have questioned whether marginal returns of education are in fact 
higher among women. Peña (2006) presents evidence from Colombia, where women 
are more likely to obtain college education, but have lower marginal returns to 
education and Hubbard (2011) finds that when correcting for top code bias in the data 
there is no gender difference in the college wage premium.  
Looking at family resources DiPrete and Buchman (2006) find that parents’ 
education and the presence of the father have a significant effect on the gender gap in 
college completion rates. Other speculations regarding why women have become 
more likely than men to attend college include “the Bill Gates syndrome” (i.e. men 
being more likely to be enticed by high-tech jobs that do not require college 
education), men being more likely to be involved in gangs and crimes, and schools 
being increasingly female-friendly, among other things because of the increased 
female ratio in the teaching occupation.  
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3.3 The Value of Education as a Signal 
While models of discrimination often suggest that those who face prejudice in the 
labor market are less likely to invest in their human capital (see e.g. Lundberg and 
Startz, 1982 and Coate and Loury, 1993), recent papers examining black workers, 
suggest that the effect may in fact be in the opposite direction (see Lang and Manove, 
2011 and Arcidiacono et al., 2010). The idea that education has value as a tool to 
signal ability to employers was introduced within economics by Spence in 1973. 
Combining the idea of signaling with models of discrimination these papers develop a 
framework to explain why given their AFQT scores, black men obtain more 
education than white men. Lang and Manove (2011) argue that the productivity of 
blacks is less easily observed than that of whites, but with increased education the 
ability of employers to evaluate their productivity improves, until at sufficiently high 
educational levels the productivity for both groups is observed equally well. In 
Arcidacono et al. (2010) productivity signals are noisy for those with less education – 
both whites and blacks – but become more accurate with increased education. 
However, as black men have lower ability (AFQT scores) on average, they are 
statistically discriminated against when productivity is not observable. In both of 
these frameworks, black workers have bigger incentive than whites to invest in their 
human capital, given their ability. 
This study applies Lang and Manove’s model of educational attainment (hereafter 
LM model) to examine gender differences in educational decisions. Whereas they set 
separate parameters for black and white workers, based on the assumption that 
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employers cannot observe their productivity in the same way as they can for white 
workers, I argue below that a comparable assumption can be made about women.  
As is formally shown in Montgomery (1991), groups that are inadequately 
represented in higher-level positions may be at an information disadvantage. In 
psychology and management there is a literature on how male managers may be 
worse at evaluating females’ productivity than males’ productivity (e.g. Hamner et 
al., 1974; Surmann, 1997; Bauer and Baltes, 2002). Furthermore, social networks are 
likely to run along gender lines as well as racial lines, and referrals and personal 
contacts play an important role in channeling information in the labor market.37  
Another fundamental assumption in the LM model is that the productivity 
becomes less noisy with increased education, until at relatively high-level 
productivity is observed equally well for both groups. There could be several reasons 
why one might expect discrimination to decrease with education. The productivity of 
those highly educated may for example be revealed or signaled by grades, college 
quality, or informal networks. Moreover many studies have documented more 
egalitarian gender role-attitudes among individuals with higher levels of education 
(Cherlin and Walters (1981), Thornton, Alwin, and Camburn (1983), Thornton and 
Freedman (1979)), and thus one may expect to find employers with more egalitarian 
views in the labor market for those with higher levels of education. Finally, networks 
may play a bigger role in the market for low-skill jobs, making the absence of 
network more important at lower and intermediate educational levels (see Hellerstein, 
McInerney and Neumark, 2008). 
                                                
37 See further discussion in Altonji and Blank, 1999. 
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Below the main predictions of the LM model are outlined, while for proofs and 
full description the reader is referred to Lang and Manove (2011).  
 
In the model there is a continuum of workers of different ability levels, with 
ability a distributed over some fixed interval. Workers choose their level of 
schooling, where their strategy profile is described by a continuous and differentiable 
function S(a) which is strictly increasing in their ability, a. Workers log productivity 
can be written out as  
 
,     (1) 
 
where  is a deterministic function of education and ability,  is a normal 
random variable with mean 0 and variance ,  (i.e. the effect of education on 
productivity is diminishing) and   (i.e. ability complements schooling, so the 
effect of schooling on productivity is higher for those of higher ability). Employer 
observes worker’s schooling s = S(a), and a signal of productivity p given by 
 
,    (2) 
 
where u is a random error with variance , continuous and decreasing in s.  and  
are assumed to be independently distributed.  
 




For a given , if  is large and  close to 0, then employer’s ability to 
observe worker’s productivity directly is poor. On the other hand if  = 0 and 
 = 1 then the employer observes workers’ productivity perfectly, in which case 
workers have no incentive to signal their productivity, and will consequently obtain 
the efficient level of education.  
 
From the model come the following predictions:  
a. If S(a) describes any separating equilibrium of the workers signaling game, 
then for all , , where  denotes the efficient level 
of education. 
b. If the support of worker’s abilities is the interval [a, a0], then any well-
behaved separating equilibrium S has the property that the education level 
S(a0) of the lowest-type worker must be efficient and not influenced by 
signaling. 
c. Let s* be the lowest value of s such that  (i.e. such that employer 
observes worker’s productivity perfectly) for all s s* and let a*=A(s*). Then 
for , S(a) is the same as in the case where information about 
productivity is perfect at all levels of education. 
 
This means that at intermediate levels of ability, education is higher for those, whose 
productivity is imperfectly observed, than those whose productivity is perfectly 
observed, while at the extremes of the ability distribution, there is no value of 
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education as a productivity signal. Thus at the top and bottom of the ability 
distribution everyone gets the same level of education, independent of how well their 
productivity is observed.  
3.4 Data 
 The paper uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). 
Since 1979, the NLSY has surveyed individuals born between 1957 and 1964. The 
surveys were conducted annually until 1994, and every other year since then. I use 
data through the 2000 wave of the survey, at which point the respondents are between 
36 and 43 of age.  
 
Wages: The wage variable refers to the hourly rate of pay at the most recent job from 
the CPS (Current Population Survey) section of the NLSY. The hourly pay is updated 
using deflators from the 2011 Economic Report of the President. In the analysis 
observations where real hourly rate of pay is less than $1 or more than $100 are 
dropped. In the analysis which is performed on the individual level, I use hourly 
earnings from the 1996, 1998, and 2000 waves of the survey, and calculated the mean 
hourly earnings, to obtain comparable results to Lang and Manove (2011). 
Education: Education is measured by the highest grade completed. When regressions 
are performed at the individual level I look at highest grade completed as of 2000. For 
those where the information is missing I use highest grade completed as of 1998, and 
then for 1996. Observations where education is decreasing are excluded. 
AFQT: In the analysis ability is proxied by the Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) score. The AFQT scores are standardized by age of the individual at the time 
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the test is taken, such that for each age group the mean test score is zero and the 
standard deviation equals one.  
Aid Receipt:  The variable is created from monthly histories that describe AFDC, 
TANF, SSI and food stamp income, and counts the number of months within a year 
that an individual (or his/her spouse) receives aid from at least one of these sources. 
AFDC or Aid to Families with Dependent Children was a federal assistance program, 
used to provide financial assistance to children whose families had low or no income. 
The program was replaced in 1996 by the more restrictive TANF (Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families) program. SSI is the Supplemental Security Income; a 
government program, which provides stipends to low-income people who are either 
aged, blind or disabled. The Food Stamp Program, or the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program, is a federal-assistance program, providing in-kind transfers to 
low- and no-income families.  
Spousal Income:  Spousal income is the sum of the spouse’s salary, military pay, and 
self-employment income. 
Weights: I use sampling weights in the statistical analysis to account for 
disproportionate sampling.  
 
 Summary statistics, by race/ethnicity and gender, are presented in Table 3.1. As 
can be seen in the table, women in the sample have higher college completion rates 
than men among all ethnicity groups. Table 3.2 shows the significance of the gender 
gap by groups, indicating a significant gap among whites and blacks, and in particular 
for those from families with medium income. The share of males among those who 
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graduate from college is significantly higher among whites than blacks, and is higher 
for those from higher income families. Becker, Hubbard and Murphy (2010) and 
Jacob (2002) focus on gender differences in the distribution of non-cognitive skills, as 
an explanation for the gender gap in college attendance. Table 3.4 demonstrates the 
gender differences in the mean and standard deviation of the AFQT test score 
distribution for different groups. In line with the argument in Becker et al. (2010), 
there is not a significant difference in the means, while the standard deviation is 
significantly higher among men for all groups except for those from high-income 
households.  
3.5 Empirical Analysis and Results 
3.5.1 The Signaling Model: Races vs. Genders 
 Appendix Table 6 shows the results when the signaling model is estimated for 
blacks and whites as is done in Lang and Manove (2011). This is comparable to 
results shown in Table 2 in their paper. The positive coefficient on the interaction 
term between race and ability and in particular the significantly negative coefficient 
for race/ethnicity and ability squared, is consistent with the model they present and 
suggests that given their ability blacks and Hispanics have incentive to obtain higher 
levels of education that whites of same ability. Appendix Table 7 estimates the effect 
of education on log hourly wages (Table 3 in LM) and Appendix Table 8 the effect of 
AFQT scores on log hourly wages (Table 4 in LM). Appendix Table 7 shows how 
there is a corresponding increase in the wage gap, given education, as on average 
white men have higher AFQT given their education than blacks and Hispanics, while 
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there is little evidence that there are different returns for AFQT scores between the 
race/ethnicity groups.38  
As discussed in Section 3.4 I would expect to see similar results when looking at 
the difference between men and women’s educational decisions. However as can be 
seen in Figure 3.1, while the AFQT distribution is significantly different between 
whites and blacks, the contrast between men and women is not as stark. Table 3.3 
shows that the only group with a marginal significant gender-difference in the mean 
AFQT score is Hispanics. On the other hand the standard deviation is significantly 
higher for men in all groups shown in the table. The story of statistical discrimination 
emphasized in Arcidiacono et al. (2010), would not be a plausible story for observed 
differences between men and women. On the other hand, as discussed in Section 3.3, 
there are reasons why women are more likely to be discriminated against than men, 
especially at lower level of educations when ability is not observable. Less 
established social networks and less egalitarian views are for example likely to 
diminish women’s returns in the labor market among those with less education.  
3.5.2 The Signaling Model: Races vs. Genders 
As discussed in Section 3.3, a model of signaling and discrimination comparable to 
Lang and Manove (2011) predicts that women have increased incentive to obtain 
education at intermediate levels of ability. Given that women spend less time in the 
labor market and are hence likely to have a lower return to their ability and education 
than men, other things equal, it is reasonable to think that absent of the signaling 
                                                
38 The coefficients in Appendix Table 2 are very close to the ones in Table 3 in LM. However, as the 
standard errors are bigger especially for the coefficients on the blacks interaction terms, the 
coefficients are not as significant as the ones in LM. 
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mechanism, women’s educational attainment lies below that of men, given their 
ability. As the model predicts that the value of signaling is negligible near the 
extremes of the AFQT distribution, men may be expected to obtain higher level of 
education than women for these parts of the distribution. The primary prediction of 
the model is that education as a function of AFQT is more concave for women than 
for men. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the smoothed relationship between test scores and 
education, by gender and race/ethnicity. The graphs imply that the gender gap in 
educational levels for whites, given their ability, is not large. However, women’s 
college completion rates are slightly higher, until at approximately one and a half 
standard deviation above the mean AFQT score, where men overtake women. For 
blacks the level of schooling is similar at the bottom of the ability distribution, but is 
diverging with higher AFQT scores, and for Hispanics, women have higher level of 
education at the intermediate ability levels, while men appear to have more education 
at the extremes of the distribution. In order to further investigate whether the 
signaling hypothesis is supported by the data I estimate a specification of the 
following form:  
 
 
 , (4) 
 
 
Educationi is the highest grade completed in years. The specification controls for 
cohort fixed effects and Zi is a vector including additional regressors, such as 
family’s income distribution, and parents’ educational attainment. The standard errors 
91 
 
are heteroskedasticity robust. The results for whites, shown in Table 3.4 (Columns 1 
and 2), are consistent with the prediction of the signaling model. The female 
coefficient is significant and positive for all ethnicity groups indicating the gender 
difference in educational attainment when AFQT is at the mean (i.e. equals zero). For 
whites the gender difference in education is maximized at AFQT score just above the 
mean (AFQT = .210 (.103/(2x.245)), producing educational gap of approximately 
.551 years. Including controls for parents’ education and family income increases the 
maximized gender gap to .725 years of education. When looking at blacks and whites, 
Lang and Manove find the gap to be maximized at 1.3 years of education. While the 
gender gap is somewhat smaller, the results suggest that at AFQT scores between -
1.29 and 1.71 women obtain more schooling than men of same ability, covering 88% 
of whites in the sample. The coefficients for blacks and Hispanics are imprecisely 
estimated and ability does not appear to affect men and women’s educational 
decisions in a different way (see Columns 3-6 in Table 3.4). 
3.5.3 Earnings and Education 
 The LM signaling model suggests that women receive relatively low wages at the 
intermediate levels, as given their education they have lower ability on average. At 
the low and high levels of schooling their wage rate would be expected to be closer to 







In Table 3.5.a I report the estimates without any attempt to correct for selection 
into the labor market. The results for whites (Columns 1 and 2) are in line with the 
predictions of the LM model, where returns to education are initially lower for 
women than for men, but then become more positive. Returns for men are essentially 
higher for males at all education levels, with the gender gap being maximized for 
those who have 14 years of education. The coefficients for blacks (Columns 3 and 4) 
are imprecisely estimated, and while the coefficients are very significant for 
Hispanics (Columns 5 and 6) they point to the opposite direction to that predicted in 
the model, suggesting there is another mechanism behind the gender wage gap among 
them.  
When looking at wages, one needs to take into consideration how gender 
differences in labor market participation affect the results. Furthermore, as shown in 
Neal (2004) there is substantial differences in how white and black women self-select 
into the labor market. The average young black woman who does not participate in 
the labor market is a single mother receiving government aid, while the modal young 
white woman is a married mother receiving support from a working spouse. It is thus 
likely that the wage variable overestimates the returns to black women, but 
underestimates it for white women. To adjust for the selection I impute wages for the 
missing observations in the following way: 
a. I construct a pseudo wage variable, where for those who were not in the labor 
market or employed in a current year, but had a positive hourly rate of pay in 
the year before, the pseudo wage variable takes the value of last year’s pay.  
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b. A second wage variable is based on the wage imputation suggested by Neal 
(2004), where those who have no postsecondary education, no spousal 
income, and received government aid for at least 12 months in the last three 
years are assigned hourly rate of pay of 1 dollar; and secondly those with at 
least high school education, and a reported spousal earnings that placed their 
spouse in the ninetieth percentile in the personal income distribution for men 
between 25-35 of the same race, are assigned a wage of 30 dollars per hour. 
c. The third wage variable combines the imputations in a. and b. 
 
 In Table 3.5.b I use the rules above when estimating equation (5), using median 
regression for the second two wage variables. Here individual-by-year observations 
are used from a panel from 1979-2000 and the White/Huber standard errors control 
for correlation at the individual level. The results for white women do not 
significantly change, although they suggest that the gender gap in wages is 
maximized at a lower level of education (10, 9 and 9 years for rules a, b and c 
respectively). Implementing a Neal type wage imputation increases the precision 
considerably for the black sample. Like the results for Hispanics in Table 3.5.a, the 
results indicate a wage curve for black females that is concave, and never crosses the 
male wage curve. Under rule b and c, the wage gap is minimized at 13 years of 
education.  
3.5.4 Earnings and AFQT 
 When regressing earnings on AFQT scores, women are expected to have higher 
relative wages at the intermediate levels, as on average they should have higher level 
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of education given their test score. However, the results in Table 3.6.a suggest that 
there is no significant difference in how AFQT scores affect the wages of men and 
women. In Table 3.6.b I use imputed wages to address possible selection problems, 
when studying the wage outcome of women. Here the coefficient on Female*AFQT 
becomes significantly positive among whites, supporting the predictions of the model. 
While the results for blacks are significant, they are in the opposite direction.. 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
The analysis in this paper contributes to the literature on why women tend to 
obtain more schooling than men, and are significantly more likely than men to enroll 
in and complete college. Discrimination against women in the labor market has 
undoubtedly decreased in the last few decades, and the underlying story here is that 
this has been particularly prevalent in the labor market for educated workers, which 
has increased women’s incentive to obtain college education. There are several 
reasons why this might be the case. Ability may be more accurately revealed with 
increased levels of education, employers in the labor market for less educated 
workers may have more prejudice against female workers, and women may 
increasingly use education to signal their labor market attachment, as those who plan 
to spend more time out of the labor market have less incentive to spend their time and 
money on education.  
The findings in the paper support the predictions of a signaling model in a labor 
market where employers’ observations of women’s productivity is noisier than that of 
men, but the precision of their observational abilities improves with increased 
education of the worker.  In the paper I find that women on average obtain more 
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education than men given their ability, and this is especially the case at the 
intermediate levels of the ability distribution while schooling at the extreme ability 
level is more similar. The analysis in the paper is set in a static framework. To explain 
not only why women are more likely to complete college than men, but also why 
there has been such a drastic change in the last decades, a time-dimensional change 
needs to be added to the framework. 
Moreover, while the gender gap in educational attainment is most prominent 
among racial minorities, the results in the paper primarily support the signaling story 
for whites, suggesting there are other factors contributing to the phenomenon. It may 
be the case among minority groups that men face as much discrimination as women, 
and in some cases even more, hence the gender difference in the incentive to signal 
ability through education may be negligible. Different labor market behavior among 
white and black women may also play a role in explaining the relatively larger gap 
among blacks, as women’s labor market participation rates are higher among blacks 
than whites, especially for those of higher ability and educational levels. 
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Table 3.1.  Gender Gap in Educational and Labor Market Outcomes – By Race/Ethnicity 
 
  Whites Blacks Hispanics 
  Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Observations 48,539 45,110 21,849 20,456 15,141 13,484 
(Individuals) (3,320) (3,264) (1,412) (1,405) (850) (880) 
        
AFQT       
 Mean 0.371 0.373 -0.654 -0.620 -0.338 -0.415 
 SD 0.996 0.934 0.773 0.681 0.897 0.815 
        
Graduate from college (%) 0.231 0.259 0.139 0.195 0.143 0.152 
        
Family Income in 1978 (%)       
 Less than 10,000  26.1 23.5 50.6 54.0 43.2 40.9 
 Between 10,000 and 30,000 52.8 54.2 44.0 40.0 48.9 52.1 
 More than 30,000 21.2 22.3 5.42 6.1 7.9 7.0 
        
Father's Education (years) 11.9 11.8 10.3 10.1 8.2 8.2 
Mother's Education (years) 11.7 11.6 10.9 10.7 7.8 7.9 
        
Log of Real Wage       
 Ages < 25 6.74 6.57 6.64 6.53 6.72 6.58 
 Ages 25-30 7.12 6.88 6.92 6.75 7.01 6.85 
 Ages 30-35 7.31 7.04 7.01 6.88 7.17 6.97 
 Ages > 35 7.54 7.14 7.15 7.01 7.33 7.08 
Notes: Observations come from the 1979-2008 panel of the NLSY79. Family income is calculated for those respondants who reported 
living with their parents when first interviewed in 1979. Log of real wage uses the hourly rate of pay at the most recent job from the 




Table 3.2.  Gender Difference (male-female) in College  
Completion Rates by Race and Family Income 
 
 Whites Blacks Hispanics 
All -.028*** -.056*** -.009 
 (.010) (.014) (.016) 
Low Income Famly -.036* -.017 -.027 
 (.020) (.020) (.025) 
Medium Family Income -.044** -.095*** .009 
 (.020) (.029) (.030) 
High Family Income -.040 -.176* .027 
 (.035) (.092) (.092) 
Notes: Family income is calculated for those respondants who reported living with their parents 




Table 3.3.  Gender Differences in AFQT means and SD  
– by Race and Family Income 
–  
 Mean (male-female) SD (male/female) 
 (a) (b) 
Whites -.002 1.066*** 
 (.024)  
Blacks -.034 1.077*** 
 (.027)  
Hispanics .077* 1.101*** 
 (.041)  
Low Income Famly -.044 1.099*** 
 (.034)  
Medium Family Income -.016 1.067*** 
 (.034)  
High Family Income .049 1.031 
 (.058)  
Notes: Column (a) presents the gender difference in AFQT scores. 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 
percent level, ** at 5 percent and *** at 1 percent. The p-values 
correspond to the two-tailed t- test, allowing for unequal variances 
between groups. Column (b) reports the ratio of men's and women's 
standard deviation. The p-values correspond to a F-test, and  * indicates 
the reatio is significantly bigger than one  at the 10 percent level, ** at 5 




Table 3.4.  Regressions of Education on AFQT with Gender Interactions, by Ethnicity Groups 
 
  White Black Hispanic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Constant 12.68*** 10.17*** 14.07*** 12.67*** 13.32*** 13.75*** 
  (.114) (.305) (.168) (.377) (.237) (.656) 
AFQT 1.60*** 1.23*** 1.64*** 1.58*** 1.82*** 1.52*** 
  (.058) (.073) (.117) (.138) (.122) (.159) 
AFQT2 .207*** .257*** -.243** -.168 -.288** -.074 
  (.047) (.054) (.107) (.123) (.130) (.147) 
Female .540*** .714*** .600*** .597*** .559*** .700*** 
  (.093) (.111) (.164) (.200) (.202) (.250) 
Female*AFQT .103 .110 .192 -.115 -.039 -.091 
  (.089) (.112) (.151) (.176) (.176) (.208) 
Female*AFQT2 -.245*** -.276*** -.121 -.155 -.276 -.273 
  (.071) (.086) (.138) (.167) (.188) (.222) 
Interaction equals 0        
 at AFQT scores -1.29, 1.71 -1.42, 1.81 -1.57, 3.16 -2.37, 1.63 -1.50, 1.35 -1.78, 1.44 
        
Cohort F.E. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Other Controls  !  !  ! 
        
N  3,635 2,247 2,192 1,128 1,345 767 
Notes: The dependent variable is the highest grade an individual obtains while in  the NLSY79 sample. Standard errors in parentheses 
are robust. Interaction equals 0 solves the quadratic equation a + bAFQT + cAFQT2  = 0, where a is the female constant, b is the 
coefficicent on female*AFQT and c is the coefficient on female*AFQT2; i.e. it indicates at which AFQT scores the educational 






Table 3.5.a  Regressions of Log Hourly Wages on Education with Gender Interactions, by Ethnicity Groups 
 
  White Black Hispanic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Constant 5.67*** 4.68*** 6.33*** 5.72*** 7.30*** 6.85*** 
  (.393) (.588) (.616) (.756) (.264) (.306) 
Education .179*** .247*** .027 .095 -.070* -.073* 
  (.054) (.078) (.088) (.108) (.041) (.043) 
Education2/100 -.291 -.563** .278 .077 .558*** .547*** 
  (.183) (.254) (.311) (.372) (.164) (.168) 
Female .704 1.22 -1.44* -1.42 -1.33*** -1.46*** 
  (.581) (.780) (.804) (1.06) (.338) (.468) 
Female*Education -.154* -.232** .191* .206 .168*** .185*** 
  (.080) (.107) (.115) (.148) (.052) (.069) 
Female*Education2/10
0 
.543** .824** -.707* -.812 -.619*** -.664*** 
  (.270) (.355) (.402) (.510) (.207) (.257) 
Interaction equals 0        
 at Education Level 6, 23 7, 21 - - - - 
        
Cohort F.E. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
        
Other Controls  !  !  ! 
        
N  3,599 2,215 2,105 1,081 1,335 758 
Notes: The dependent variable is the highest grade an individual obtains while in  the NLSY79 sample. Standard errors in parentheses 
are robust. Interaction equals 0 solves the quadratic equation a + bEDUC + cEDUC2  = 0, where a is the female constant, b is the 
coefficicent on female*EDUC and c is the coefficient on female*EDUC2; i.e. it indicates at which educational level the hourly wage is 








Table 3.5.b  Regressions of Wages on Educational  
Attainment with Gender Interactions, by Race 
 
  Whites  
  Rule a Rule b Rule c 
    
Constant 5.85*** 5.83*** 5.93*** 
 (.182) (.105) (.100) 
Education (years) -.008 -.011 -.027*** 
 (.0151) (.012) (.008) 
Educ.2/100 .221*** .258*** .307*** 
 (.062) (.044) (.030) 
Female -.078 -.129 -.165** 
 (.125) (.083) (.072) 
Female*Educ. -.036* -.016 -.011 
 (.021) (.012) (.010) 
Female*Educ.2/100 .182** .093** .062* 
 (.085) (.046) (.033) 
    Blacks   
  Rule a Rule b Rule c 
    
Constant 6.36*** 6.61*** 6.69*** 
 (.212) (.188) (.145) 
Education (years) -.089*** -.114*** -.134*** 
 (.030) (.020) (.016) 
Educ.2/100 .577*** .716*** .778*** 
 (.122) (.080) (.067) 
Female -.556*** -.748*** -.699 
 (.208) (.111) (.099) 
Female*Educ. .048 .102*** .089*** 
 (.034) (.019) (..016) 
Female*Educ.2/100 -.137 -.390*** -.353*** 
  (.141) (.078) (.070) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log wage, where wage refers to the hourly rate of pay 
updated to 2011 USD. Rule a: use last year's wages for an individual who is not working but 
was employed in the year before. Rule b:For individuals not working I impute a wage of $1.00 
for all long-term aid recipients with no postsecondary education and no spousal support and a 
wage of $30.00 for those with at least 12 years of schooling, and a spousal support that place 
the spouse above the ninetieth percentile in the persional income distribution for men in that 
age, and race/ethnicity group. Rule c combines Rule a and Rule b. For Rule a the standard 
errors in parentheses are robust, and clustered at the individual level. The reported estimates 
for Rule b and Rule c come from a median regression with bootstrapped standard errors.  Other 







Table 3.6.a  Regressions of Log Hourly Wages on AFQT Scores with Gender Interactions, by Ethnicity Groups 
 
  White Black Hispanic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Constant 7.42*** 6.83*** 7.48*** 7.30*** 7.45*** 7.17*** 
  (.036) (.120) (.051) (.120) (.065) (.138) 
AFQT .269*** .227*** .320*** .359*** .267*** .241*** 
  (.023) (.034) (.031) (.039) (.032) (.043) 
AFQT2/100 -.188 -1.48 -2.06 -4.77 -.257 -3.05 
  (1.64) (2.17) (2.79) (3.26) (3.35) (3.81) 
Female -.299*** -.319*** -.113** -.186*** -.093** -.125** 
  (.030) (.040) (.046) (.058) (.047) (.061) 
Female*AFQT -.045 -.048 .016 -.082* .031 -.015 
  (.032) (.044) (.041) (.050) (.042) (.053) 
Female*AFQT2/100 .936 2.25 -3.44 2.55 -11.5*** -5.73 
  (2.40) (3.24) (3.88) (.047) (4.31) (5.39) 
Interaction equals 0   .     
 at AFQT scores -3.74; 8.55 -2.85: 4.98 - - - - 
        
Cohort F.E. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
        
Other Controls  !  !  ! 
        
N  3,466 2,148 2,044 1,059 1,262 724 
Notes: The dependent variable is the highest grade an individual obtains while in  the NLSY79 sample. Standard errors in parentheses are 
robust. Interaction equals 0 solves the quadratic equation a + bAFQT + cAFQT2  = 0, where a is the female constant, b is the coefficicent 
on female*AFQT and c is the coefficient on female*AFQT2; i.e. it indicates at which AFQT scores the hourly wage is the same for men 








Table 3.6.b Regressions of Wages on  
AFQT Scores with Gender Interactions, by Race 
 
    Whites   
  Rule a Rule b Rule c 
    
Constant 5.85*** 5.83*** 5.86*** 
 (.065) (.107) (.113) 
AFQT .115*** .110*** .098*** 
 (.011) (.004) (.007) 
AFQT2/100 -1.37* -.838*** -.464 
 (.780) (.285) (.486) 
Female -.230*** -.175*** -.201*** 
 (.015) (.005) (.007) 
Female*AFQT .049*** .039*** .043*** 
 (.018) (.010) (.011) 
Female*AFQT2/100 -1.12 -.691 -.791 
 (1.26) (.660) (.718) 
    Blacks   
  Rule a Rule b Rule c 
    
Constant 6.08*** 6.15*** 6.16*** 
 (.136) (.123) (.144) 
AFQT .148*** .163*** .155*** 
 (.018) (.011) (.010) 
AFQT2/100 -2.76* -2.53*** -2.27*** 
 (1.58) (.869) (.864) 
Female -.101*** -.050*** -.095*** 
 (.027) (.015) (.010) 
Female*AFQT .030 .003 .006 
 (.028) (.015) (.016) 
Female*AFQT2/100 -4.80* -4.90*** -5.48*** 
  (2.64) (1.25) (1.19) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log wage, where wage refers to the hourly rate of pay 
updated to 2011 USD. Rule a: use last year's wages for an individual who is not working but 
was employed in the year before. Rule b:For individuals not working I impute a wage of $1.00 
for all long-term aid recipients with no postsecondary education and no spousal support and a 
wage of $30.00 for those with at least 12 years of schooling, and a spousal support that place 
the spouse above the ninetieth percentile in the persional income distribution for men in that 
age, and race/ethnicity group. Rule c combines Rule a and Rule b. For Rule a the standard 
errors in parentheses are robust, and clustered at the individual level. The reported estimates 
for Rule b and Rule c come from a median regression with bootstrapped standard errors.  Other 
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Appendix for Chapter 1 
Table A.1.  Dates of Legal Change Granting Early Access to the Pill  
(from Bailey, 2006) 
 
State  Year of Law Change Type of Law Change  
Alabama  1971  MM  
Alaska  1960  AOM  
Arizona  1972  AOM  
Arkansas  1960  AOM  
California  1972  AOM  
Colorado  1971  MM  
Conneticut  1972  MM  
Delaware  1972  AOM  
District of Columbia 1971  CFP  
Florida  1974  AOM  
Georgia  1968  CFP  
Hawaii  1970  MM  
Idaho  1963  FAM  
Illinois  1971  MM  
Indiana  1973  AOM  
Iowa  1973  AOM  
Kansas  1970  MM  
Kentucky  1968  AOM  
Louisiana  1972  AOM  
Maine  1971  AOM  
Maryland  1967  MM  
Massachusetts  1974  AOM  
Michigan  1972  AOM  
Minnesota  1973  AOM  
Mississippi  1966  MM  
Missouri  1976  SC  
Montana  1971  AOM  
Nebraska  1972  AOM  
Nevada  1969  FAM  
New Hampshire  1971  MM  
New Jersey  1973  AOM  
New Mexico  1971  AOM  
New York  1971  MM  
North Carolina  1971  AOM  
North Dakota  1972  AOM  
Ohio  1965  SC  
Oklahoma  1966  FAM  
Oregon  1971  MM  
Pennsylvania  1971  MM  
Rhode Island  1972  AOM  
South Carolina  1972  MM  
South Dakota  1972  AOM  
Tennessee  1971  AOM  








(continued from previous page) 
 
      
Utah  1962  FAM  
Vermont  1972  AOM  
Virginia  1971  MM  
Washington  1971  AOM  
West Virginia  1972  AOM  
Wisconsin  1973  AOM  
Wyoming  1969  CFP  
Notes: This table is copied from Bailey (2006) and shows the date of legal change, i.e. the 
earliest year, in which unmarried, childless woman under age 21 could legally obtain 
medical treatment without parental or spousal consent. AOM imples a statutory change in 
the legal age of majority from 21 to 18 or 19. FAM refers to a change in age of majority 
(or an existing law) applying to women only. MM dentoes a mature minor doctrine that 
allowed legal infants to consent to medical care as long as they were mature enough to 
understant "the nature and the consequence of the treatment". CFP den otes a 
comprehensive family planning statute that allowed or did not expressly restrict physicians 
from treating legal minors. SC referst to changes at the Supreme Court level: the 1965 















Table A.2.   List of Occupations and Associated Outcome Variables 
 
Name of Occupation Average 
Income in 
1970 USD 
Rank Siegel Occ. 
Prestige 
Score 
Rank Male Ratio Rank 
Physician 26,870.6 1 81.5 1 92.0% 11 
Dentist 23,610.6 2 73.6 4 98.1% 2 
Lawyer 21,771.4 3 75.7 3 95.9% 8 
Veterinarian 19,167.6 4 59.7 13 95.8% 9 
Optometrist 19,001.0 5 62.0 9 97.9% 3 
Architect 16,862.3 6 70.5 6 96.9% 6 
Management/ 
Administration 
16,646.7 7 50.3 21 87.2% 14 
Engineer 15,174.0 8 64.4 8 98.6% 1 
Business – Sales 13,216.5 9 37.6 24 86.0% 15 
Accountant 12,982.4 10 56.7 15 92.0% 12 
Writer/ Journalist 12,957.9 11 59.8 12 71.4% 19 
Statistician 12,928.6 12 55.4 17 76.7% 16 
Pharmacist 12,811.4 13 60.7 11 88.5% 13 
Psychologist 12,521.4 14 71.4 5 62.6% 21 
Law Enforcement 12,003.6 15 47.8 23 96.4% 7 
College Teacher/ 
Scientific Researcher 
11,437.6 16 78.3 2 73.1% 17 
Conservationist/ 
Forester 
11,064.0 17 53.9 18 97.8% 4 
Artist 9,934.0 18 . 16 64.8% 20 
Lab Technician/ 
Hygienist 
9,829.6 19 50.2 22 71.5% 18 
Therapist 8,250.1 20 36.7 25 31.9% 24 
Teacher (Sec.) 8,149.4 21 59.6 14 51.5% 22 
Social Worker 8,115.3 22 52.4 19 37.1% 23 
Military 8,046.0 23 NA - 97.3% 5 
Dietitian/ Home 
Economist 
7,729.3 24 52.1 20 6.2% 26 
Clergyman 7,283.1 25 69.0 7 93.7% 10 
Teacher (Elem.) 6,933.4 26 59.6 14 16.6% 25 
Nurse 6,642.1 27 61.5 10 3.8% 27 
Notes: Outcome variables are from the 1970 Census. To calculate average income and the gender ratio 
I look at college graduates who are currently employed. The prestige scores are assigned to the 1950 
occupational codes in the census, where there is only one group for non-college teaching; elementary 









Table A.3.   The Effect on Men’s Career Plans by Type of Law Change  
 
  Mean of Dep. 
Variable 
Type of Law Men 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome Variable      
 Average Income 15,117 AOM 221.0* 253.0** 207.6 
    (113.6) (116.2) (141.6) 
   Other -3.91 28.4 -60.6 
    (215.5) (219.8) (205.8) 
 Siegel Prestige Score 61.8 AOM -.438 -.388 .035 
    (.328) (.343) (.302) 
   Other -.335 -.285 -.726 
    (.432) (.397) (.561) 
 Share of Males 0.858 AOM .010** .011** .010** 
    (.004) (.005) (.005) 
   Other .023** .024** .025*** 
    (.009) (.009) (.009) 
Specificaton      
 Additional Controls   ! ! ! 
 Abortion Control    ! ! 
 State Specific Time Trend    ! 
Observations   1,150,093 1,150,093 1,150,093 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). All 
specifications include state fixed effect, college cohort fixed effect, and controls for race. Additional 
controls include dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife, 












Table A.4.  The Effect of Pill Access on Grade Distribution of College Freshmen 
 
   Women 
   All High Select. Medium Select. Low, No Select. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Avg. High 
School Grades 
5.31 6.18 5.68 5.02 
           
 Access to Pill  .103 -.011 -.040 -.026 -.142 -.143 .095* .001 
   (.074) (.084) (.110) (.111) (.127) (.114) (.052) (.100) 
Specificaton         
 Additional  
Controls 
!  !  !  ! 
 Abortion 
Control 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 State Specific 
Time Trend 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Observations 1,539,136 453,782 353,170 732,184 
   Men 
   All High Select. Medium Select. Low, No Select. 
   (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Avg. High 
School Grades 
4.68 5.86 5.05 4.31 
           
 Access to Pill  .003 -.069 .059 .065 -.229* -.225 .008 -.061 
   (.064) (.116) (.132) (.131) (.136) (.130) (.074) (.141) 
Specificaton         
 Additional  
Controls 
!  !  !  ! 
 Abortion 
Control 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 State Specific 
Time Trend 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Observations 1,587,037 540,488 324,002 722,547 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). 
All specifications include state fixed effect, college cohort fixed effect, and controls for race. Additional 
controls include dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife and 














Table A.5.  The Effect of Pill Access on the Distribution of Students’ College 
Selectivity 
 
   Women 
   All  High Grades Medium Grades Low Grades 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Avg. College 
Selectivity 
1.63 2.31 1.57 0.865 
           
 Access to 
Pill  
.212 -.008 .255 -.059 .153 -.003 .236 .054 
   (.259) (.074) (.294) (.065) (.237) (.080) (.255) (.084) 
Specificaton         
 Additional  
Controls 
!  !  !  ! 
 Abortion 
Control 




! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Observations 1,539,136 460,768 903,214 164,782 
   Men 
   All  High Grades Medium Grades Low Grades 
   (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Avg. College 
Selectivity 
1.63 2.60 1.70 0.974 
           
 Access to 
Pill  
.161 .033 .258 -.159 .080 -.009 .195 .120 
   (.243) (.072) (.336) (.061) (.226) (.076) (.248) (.095) 
Specificaton         
 Additional Controls !  !  !  ! 
 Abortion 
Control 




! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Observations 1,587,037 359,149 903,840 314,849 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by state  (* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). 
All specifications include state fixed effect, college cohort fixed effect, and controls for race. Additional 
controls include dummies for father's college degree, mother's college degree, mother is a housewife and 
whether individual is catholic. The dependent variable takes integer values from 0 (=no selectivity) to 5 









Appendix for Chapter 3 
Table A.6.  Regressions of Education on AFQT  
with Race/Ethnicity Interactions, by Sex 
 
  Men Women 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Constant 12.79*** 10.64*** 13.27*** 11.33*** 
  (.127) (.328) (.132) (.341) 
AFQT 1.59*** 1.29*** 1.70*** 1.37*** 
  (.058) (.073) (.067) (.093) 
AFQT2 .212*** .249*** -.034 -.015 
  (.047) (.053) (.053) (.066) 
Black 1.53*** 1.59*** 1.58*** 1.43*** 
  (.143) (.172) (.125) (.156) 
Black*AFQT .047 .254* .113 .020 
  (.128) (.147) (.117) (.147) 
Black*AFQT2 -.431*** -.394*** -.305*** -.326** 
  (.113) (.130) (.107) (.133) 
Interaction equals 0      
 at AFQT scores -1.83, 1.96 -1.71, 2.36 -2.10, 2.47 -2.06, 2.13 
      
Hispanic .802*** 1.10*** .818*** 1.22*** 
  (.154) (.209) (.162) (.207) 
Hispanic*AFQT .205 -.050 .075 -.224 
  (.133) (.159) (.143) (.171) 
Hispanic*AFQT2 -.472*** -.291** -.496*** -.302* 
  (.136) (.146) (.145) (.175) 
Interaction equals 0      
 at AFQT scores -1.10, 1.54 -2.03, 1.86 -1.21, 1.36 -2.41, 1.67 
      
Cohort F.E. ! ! ! ! 
      
Other Controls  !  ! 
      
N  3,471 2,101 3,701 2,041 
Notes: The dependent variable is the highest grade an individual obtains while in  the NLSY79 sample, 
using individuals where there is at least one observation after 1996. Standard errors in parentheses are 
robust. Interaction equals 0 solves the quadratic equation a + bAFQT + cAFQT2  = 0, where a is the 
race/ethnicity constant, b is the coefficicent on race/ethnicity*AFQT and c is the coefficient on 









Table A.7.  Regressions of Log Hourly Wages on Education with Race/Ethnicity 
Interactions, by Sex 
 
    Men Women 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Constant 5.65*** 4.74*** 6.40*** 5.87*** 
  (.393) (.566) (.430) (.520) 
Education .179*** .230*** .025 .043 
  (.054) (.078) (.059) (.074) 
Education2/100 -.292 -.523** .251 .198 
  (.183) (.254) (.199) (.245) 
Black .620 .716 -1.47** -1.64* 
  (.730) (.953) (.680) (.920) 
Black*Education -.147 -.154 .189** .241* 
  (.104) (.133) (.095) (.127) 
Black*Education2/100 .551 .613 -.667** -.884** 
  (.363) (.452) (.326) (.432) 
Interaction equals 0      
 at Education Level 5, 21 6, 19 - 13, 14 
      
Hispanic 1.67*** 2.20*** -.320 -.527 
  (.477) (.646) (.476) (.653) 
Hispanic*Education -.250*** -.310*** .063 .099 
  (.069) (.091) (.067) (.091) 
Hispanic*Education2/100 .857*** 1.07*** -.269 -.390 
  (.247) (.314) (.237) (.313) 
Interaction equals 0      
 at Education Level 10, 19 12. 17 7, 16 8, 18 
      
Cohort F.E. ! ! ! ! 
      
Other Controls   !   ! 
      
N  3,500 2,113 3,539 1,941 
Notes: The dependent variable is the highest grade an individual obtains while in  the NLSY79 sample, 
using individuals where there is at lest one observation after the age of 25. Standard errors in parentheses 
are robust. Interaction equals 0 solves the quadratic equation a + bEDUC + cEDUC2  = 0, where a is the 
female constant, b is the coefficicent on female*EDUC and c is the coefficient on female*EDUC2; i.e. it 
indicates at which educational level the hourly wage is the same for men and women, other things equal. 











Table A.8.  Regressions of Log Hourly Wages on  
AFQT with Race/Ethnicity Interactions, by Sex 
 
    Men Women 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Constant 7.51*** 6.83*** 7.13*** 6.74*** 
  (.052) (.129) (.040) (.128) 
AFQT .269*** .221*** .225*** .200*** 
  (.023) (.034) (.022) (.031) 
AFQT2/100 .040 -1.17 .766 .462 
  (1.64) (2.15) (1.77) (2.36) 
Black -.040 .052 .136*** .153*** 
  (.041) (.049) (.037) (.050) 
Black*AFQT .052 .093* .109*** .056 
  (.038) (.049) (.035) (.044) 
Black*AFQT2/100 -1.72 -2.85 -5.27 -2.13 
  (3.25) (.3.86) (3.24) (4.18) 
Interaction equals 0      
 at AFQT scores - -.0.49; 3.75 -0.88; 2.94 -1.67; 4.30 
      
Hispanic .029 .125** .233*** .271*** 
  (.040) (.057) (.039) (.054) 
Hispanic*AFQT -.013 -.026 .066* .027 
  (.041) (.050) (.035) (.046) 
Hispanic*AFQT2/100 .997 -1.08 -11.3*** -8.62** 
  (3.78) (4.42) (3.21) (.044) 
Interaction equals 0      
 at AFQT scores - -4.81; 2.41 -1.17; 1.76 -1.62; 1.94 
      
Cohort F.E. ! ! ! ! 
      
Other Controls   !   ! 
      
N  3,348 2,037 3,424 1,894 
Notes: The dependent variable is the highest grade an individual obtains while in  the NLSY79 sample, 
using individuals where there is at least one observation after 1996. Standard errors in parentheses are 
robust. Interaction equals 0 solves the quadratic equation a + bAFQT + cAFQT2  = 0, where a is the 
race/ethnicity constant, b is the coefficicent on race/ethnicity*AFQT and c is the coefficient on 
race/ethnicity*AFQT2. Other controls include parents educational levels, and family income in 1979. 
 
